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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The main issue on appeal is whether this Court should allow the Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare's ("Department") to continue a decade long practice of making 
impermissible and overly broad estate recovery claims. This case requires review of a federal 
statute (42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)) and Idaho Code ("I.c.") § 56-218 and IDAPA 16.03.09.9001, and 
a determination as to whether the Department's claim premised on state law conflicts with 
federal law and is therefore preempted by federal law. 
Federal law requires the states to make claims against the probate estates of Medicaid 
recipients to recover correctly paid benefits. Federal law also allows the states to expand the 
definition of "estate" to include non-probate assets owned by a recipient at the time of the 
recipient's death. Idaho has chosen this expanded definition of "estate." I.C. § 56-218(4)(b). 
Nothing in the federal medical assistance statutes authorizes a direct medical assistance estate 
claim against the estate of any person other than the recipient of benefits. 
Under federal law, the states are permitted to pull back into a recipient's estate any 
property or other assets in which the recipient held a legal title or interest at the time of the 
recipient's death (to the extent of the interest). Idaho's estate recovery statute, I.c. § 56-218(1), 
requires that a medical assistance claim be filed against the estate of a deceased recipient, but 
also expands recovery claims beyond that allowed by federal law and authorizes claims against 
the estate of the recipient's spouse who never received Medicaid benefits. The Department's 
1 
(now IDAPA 16.03.09.905) 
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claim against George D. Perry's ("George") Estate ("Estate"), premised on I.e. § 56-218 (R, p. 
22), conflicts with federal law because the Department asserts a claim against George's Estate 
which does not contain any assets in which Martha J. Perry ("Martha") held a legal title or 
interest at the time of her death. 
The magistrate in this case upheld the Personal Representative's ("PR") disallowance of 
the Department's claim and the district court affirmed that decision. A second Idaho magistrate 
also rejected the same type of overly broad estate recovery claim the Department makes herein 
and that decision was recently affirmed by another Idaho district court acting in its appellate 
capacity. In The Matter of the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins, Case No. CV-
2009-1926 (Idaho Third Judicial District, July 20,2011). For the Court's convenience, the 
magistrate's decision in Wiggins is attached hereto as Appendix 1 and the Wiggins district court 
decision is attached as Appendix 2. 
Statement of Facts 
The PR respectfully refers the Court to the Affidavit of Barbara McCormick and the 
exhibits attached thereto for a detailed rendition of the facts. R, p. 93-110. Martha owned the 
couple's horne as her separate property prior to her marriage to George. R, p. 133. On 
November 18, 2002, Martha executed a deed conveying the horne to "Martha Jean Perry and 
George Donald Perry" as grantees. It was recorded the same day. R, p. 134-135. 
On July 31, 2006, George conveyed Martha's remaining interest in the couple's real 
property to himself, acting as her agent pursuant to Martha's power of attorney. R p. 433. This 
deed was also recorded on the date it was signed. R, p. 99. The PR sold the horne after 
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George's death and filed a 90 day inventory listing the house sale proceeds in George's Estate as 
his separate property. There was no community property listed in the inventory. R., p. 108. The 
Department never objected to the characterization of property in this inventory. The only 
property that Martha owned at the time of her death was one financial account located at Wells 
Fargo. The balance of this Wells Fargo checking account was paid to the Department on August 
13,2010 after Martha died. R., p. 96, 110. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL/ADDITIONAL ISSUE 
The Department does not fairly state the issues presented in this appeal as required by 
I.A.R. 35(a)(4) but instead frames them to argue its case. Those issues, fairly stated, are: 
1. Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of I.e. § 56-218, in 
refusing to allow the State's claim against George's Estate. 
2. Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p as 
preempting application of I.C. § 56-218 and the Department's regulations. 
3. Whether the magistrate erred in failing to apply Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
v. lackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) to the facts of this case. 
4. Whether the magistrate erred in holding that Martha's power of attorney gave George, as 
her agent, sufficient authority to convey Martha's interest in the horne to George. 
The PR adds the following issue on appeal. 
5. Whether the Estate is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RECOVERY OF 
l\1EDICAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS CORRECTLY PAID 
i. Statutory Framework. 
The Medicaid program is jointly funded with the states as a "cooperative endeavor in 
which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in 
furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 
65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into 
state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human 
Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). After this, 
the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.c. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its 
own program within the federal requirements, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services ("CMS") administers the program and approves state plans. Arkansas Dept. of Health 
and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006). 
When detennining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider 
assets of both husband and wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.c. § 
1396r-5(c) (2000). There are several provisions in place to protect the community spouse (the 
spouse not applying for Medicaid) from being impoverished as a result of the spend down of 
assets needed to qualify the applicant for Medicaid2. Medicaid balances the obligation of 
2 Typically, a married couple is required to "spend down" one-half of their "countable" resources before one spouse 
will qualify for Medicaid. The value of the couple's home is not included among assets considered eligible to pay 
for medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(5); 42 U.S.c. § 1382b(a)(l) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid 
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community spouses to contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses 
against the accommodation of the community spouse's need for his or her own support. 
ii. Federal Medicaid Estate Recovery Provisions. 
It is important to understand pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid recovery, to give context 
to the post-1993 changes, and because pre-1993 law is the basis for the sole case in Idaho upon 
which the Department relies exclusively for its position - i.e. Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). Prior to amendments adopted in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA") of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute stated a 
general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to 
several exceptions, one of which is relevant here: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under the State plan may be made, except --
* * * * 
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he 
received such assistance, from his estate. (emphasis added) 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, 
to recover Medicaid benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery 
would be from the recipient's estate3. 
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 19934. As 
recipient is also entitled to an allowance of income and assets designated for his or her needs that is not considered 
available to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the recipient spouse 
has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, to his or her community spouse. 42 U.S.c. § 
1396p(c)(2). 
3 The statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the 
recipient's surviving spouse. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovery before the 
death of a surviving spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The 
pre-1993 federal law contained no definition of the term "estate." 
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amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover 
Medicaid payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with three (3) specific and 
limited exceptions. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) (2000). The 1993 amendments changed section 
1396p(b) in several ways. First, the 1993 amendments lowered the age criterion for recovery 
from 65 to 55. Second, the 1993 amendments made recovery allowed by the exceptions 
mandatory rather than permissive. Third, the amendments added a definition of "estate," which 
itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrecovery rule 
and the three limited exceptions are as follows: 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State 
shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid 
on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following 
individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection (a)(l)(B) of this section, 
the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or 
upon sale of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical 
assistance paid on behalf of the individual. 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical assistance consisting 
of-
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and 
related hospital and prescription drug services, ... 
(C) (i) In the case of an individual who has received (or is entitled to receive) 
benefits under a long-term care insurance policy in connection with which assets 
or resources are disregarded in the manner described in clause (ii), except as 
provided in such clause, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the 
4 OBRA of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312,627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.s.c. § 
1396p(b)(l), (4) (2000)). 
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[d. 
individual's estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of the 
individual for nursing facility and other long-term care services. 
(emphasis added) 
Under all three of the limited exceptions listed above, recovery is allowed only against 
the estate of the individual who actually received the benefits (the recipient). The amended 
version of section 1396p(b)(I)(B), at issue in the case at bar, retained the express reference to 
recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this 
recovery from the recipient's estate is only permitted after the death of the recipient's surviving 
spouse. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(2). As with the pre-1993 version, the amended federal statute 
contains no express authorization for, or reference to, recovery from a surviving spouse's estate. 
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, 
with a mandatory provision that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that 
authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the scope of probate law: 
[T]he term "estate" with respect to a deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State * * * any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to 
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of "estate" for Medicaid 
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recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be 
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass automatically to someone else on 
the recipient's death5• Thus federal statutes place limits on the state's powers to define the scope 
of recovery of medical assistance benefits correctly paid. The limits are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p. Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006). 
iii. Idaho's Medicaid Estate Recovery Provisions. 
Idaho Code I.C. § 56-218, entitled "RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE" states in pertinent part, 
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-
five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance may 
be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, 
for such aid paid to either or both: ... 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of such 
interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added). 
Idaho has adopted verbatim the optional federal provision that authorizes states to expand 
the definition of "estate" beyond the scope of state probate law. I.C. § 56-218(4)(b). Therefore, 
5 For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and one dies, the 
deceased joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate 
estate. Under the optional expanded definition of "estate" allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes 
the interest of a deceased joint tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than 
passing directly to the surviving joint tenant. 
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it follows that Idaho is required to abide by the way in which CMS and HHS read the language 
in the federal statute. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, 
it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence 
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute. (emphasis added). 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (footnotes omitted). 
The U.S. Supreme Court went on to indicate that when a statutory scheme has been 
entrusted to an agency, "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's 
construction." 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. This same principle holds true with regard to 
HHS's reading of the Medicaid statutes. In Wisconsin Dept of Health & Family Servs. v. 
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473,497, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002), the Court stated, 
The Secretary's position warrants respectful consideration. Cf. United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 
504,512 (1994) (reliance on Secretary's "significant expertise" particularly 
appropriate in the context of "a complex and highly technical regulatory program" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 
43-44 (1981) (Secretary granted "exceptionally broad authority" by Congress 
under the Medicaid statute). 
B. THE DEPARTMENT MUST ACT CONSISTENTLY WITH FEDERAL LAW. 
In In the Matter of Appeal of Stafford, 181 P.3d 456,461 (2008), this Court stated, 
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Following passage of the MCCA [Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act], the 
director of the Department requested the Attorney General's opinion as to whether 
legislation was required to implement its provisions. The Attorney General 
responded: 
While participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary, a state that 
chooses to participate must comply with all requirements imposed by the 
federal statutory provisions and by regulations promulgated by the Secretary 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services .... (emphasis added). 
One of the requirements imposed on states in order to participate in the Medicaid 
program and receive federal funding is that the state must "comply with the provisions of [42 
U.S.c. § 1396p] ... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2000). To the extent a state statute "seeks to 
reach further than § 1396p(b)(1), it cannot stand." Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923,925 (9th 
Cir. 1997). The Department does not have a choice in this matter. It must follow federallaw6. 
Idaho law currently allows the state to seek recovery for medical assistance paid "from 
the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both." 
I.e. § 56-218(1). The PR has challenged the Department's use of I.C. § 56-218(1) to 
impermissibly expand estate claims in Idaho beyond that allowed by federallaw7. The PR also 
challenges certain state regulations, such as IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 and 16.03.09.900.24 (now 
found at IDAPA 16.03.09.905) that also reach further than the limited estate recovery allowed 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b). These regulations are also preempted by federal law. 
6 The Department does recognize that it "is bound by federal law." Department's Memorandum in Support, p. 15, 
f.n. 11, R., p. 125. 
7 For instance, there may exist some circumstances in which an asset in which the Medicaid recipient holds an 
interest at death passes automatically upon death to the surviving spouse's estate. In that circumstance, the asset 
would be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate. For example, assets held jointly with rights of survivorship 
would fall into this category. That is not the case with regard to the Department's claim in this case. 
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C. THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM GOES TOO FAR, SEEKING TO RECOVER 
AGAINST ASSETS THAT ARE NOT PART OF MARTHA'S ESTATE. 
In order to be consistent with federal law, recovery claims against a Medicaid spouse's 
estate must be against "assets in which the individuallMedicaid recipient] had any legal title or 
interest at the time of death, to the extent of such interest." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). See 
also, I.e. § 56-218(4)(b). This Court should affirm the magistrate's order disallowing the 
Department's claim because that claim is against assets in which the Medicaid recipient (Martha) 
had no legal title or interest at the time of her death. 
The Magistrate recognized this core issue in his Order Disallowing Claim, p. 3 (R., p. 
507), stating, 
Jackman does not directly address the critical question for our case: To what 
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid 
recipient's interest in property - any time (after 1993) during the couple's 
marriage or the time of the recipient's death. (f.n. omitted) (emphasis added). 
The District Court agreed with the Magistrate that the Department's argument on this point was 
without merits. R., p. 713. 
The Department also relies on IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 as support for its position. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 12. That regulation states in part, 
Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's claim against the assets 
of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to Sections 56-218 and 56-218A , 
Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the 
value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, 
community property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and 
jointly owned property ... (3-30-07) (emphasis added). 
8 The magistrate in Wiggins also held that "The Department may only recover against property in which the recipient 
spouse had an interest at the time of her death." Appendix 1, Memorandum Decision, p. 7. The District Court in 
Wiggins affirmed. Appendix 2, Memorandum Decision on Appeal, p. 6. 
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Despite stating that this regulation is "subject to" LC. § 56-218 (which includes subsection 
(4 )(b)), the regulation then goes on to expand the definition of recoverable assets well beyond the 
limitations set forth in Le. § 56-218(4)(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B)9. As discussed 
below, the Magistrate properly ruled in rejecting the Department's "asset" vs. "estate" argument 
and this Court should affirm that decision in its entirety. 
D. FEDERAL LAW PREEl\1PTION OF STATE LAW 
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). Even when Congress has not chosen 
to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-
empt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state 
and federal laws is impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-
143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the state law 
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67,61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)10. 
9 IDAPA 16.03.09.900.18 (now 16.03.09.904.05) entitled "Assets in Estate Subject to Claims" implicitly recognizes 
the appropriate limitation on recovery claims when it states, "Assets in the estate from which the claim can be 
satisfied must include all real or personal property that the deceased participant owned or in which he had an 
ownership interest, including the following ... " The list that follows includes a variety of assets all of which have 
one thing in common - the participant owned a legal title or interest in the asset at the time of death or acquired the 
asset post-mortem. 
10 The District Court also provides a concise and thorough review of the preemption doctrine and how it applies in 
this case in its Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 12-16; R., p. 716-720. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 12 
E. THE DEPARTMENT'S OVERLY BROAD RECOVERY CLAIM, BASED ON I.e. § 
56-218 AND ITS REGULATIONS, CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL LAW, AND IS 
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW. 
The Department's practice of using I.C. § 56-218 to improperly expand the scope of 
estate recovery claims in Idaho violates federal law and is preempted by federal law. 
Compliance with both state and federal law is impossible when the Department makes overly 
broad estate recovery claims based on I.e. § 56-218 that reach beyond the explicit limits to 
recovery set by federal law. This impermissible expansion occurs because the Department makes 
a claim against assets which Martha did not own a legal title to or interest in at her death. As the 
district court stated, 
... [T]he federal government has outlined a general rule prohibiting recovery. As such, 
Congress has indicated its object and desire to prevent recovery in all but limited number 
of circumstances. It follows then, that if these circumstances are expanded by a 
particular state law, the state law becomes an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress to limit recovery, and is 
thereby preempted .... 
As discussed in detail above, the federal provisions limit such recovery to assets of 
the spouse in which the recipient had an interest at death. 
Because the federal provisions seek, overall, to limit recovery except in certain 
circumstances, because exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed 
narrowly, and because the state provisions expand this recovery policy, the Court 
finds the State provisions are preempted. Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 
S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed2d 753 (1989). (emphasis added). 
R., p. 718-720. 
In Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 215-216, 970 
P.2d 6,8-10 (1998), this Court held that the version of I.e. § 56-218 then in effect (pre-OBRA 
1993) authorized the Department to recover against the surviving spouse's estate but expressly 
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recognized that such recovery was limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid 
recipient's estate as defined under state probate law. The Jackman Court recognized that federal 
law does preempt the state law contained in I.C. § 56-218, and held that the only asset that might 
be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate was community property accumulated by the 
couple after the execution of their marriage settlement agreement. Id. at 215-216. This Court 
has already recognized, therefore, that federal law does preempt in the area of Medicaid recovery 
claims - i.e. with respect to I.e. § 56-218. 
As discussed infra, the Department has misread and misapplied Jackman for over a 
decade. Unfortunately, what ensued after the Jackman decision was that the Department enacted 
rules (e.g. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 and .24), and made claims in married couple Medicaid cases 
as if the Court had ruled on the very issue it explicitly did not rule upon. The Department's 
regulations (state law) conflict with federal law and are preempted by federal law. 
F. A RECENT MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION AND THE 
PROCEDURAL AFTERMATH OF THAT DECISION ARE DIRECTLY ON POINT 
AND SUPPORT AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE'S ORDER. 
In Re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) is the latest state court decision on 
point and is on all fours with the instant case. The Court's analysis in Barg provides an in-depth 
and exhaustive review of other state court cases analyzing the issue. Reading Barg in its entirety 
is very instructive because Minnesota's department of health and welfare made the very same 
argument in support of its recovery action as the Department makes in this action. The facts of 
Barg, when pared down to the essentials, are essentially the same facts present in this probate. 
In Barg, supra at 73-74, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a provision of the 
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state's Medicaid estate recovery statute that allowed recovery from the estate of a surviving 
spouse for any assets jointly owned by the couple at any point during their marriage!!. In that 
case, Mrs. Barg transferred her partial interest in the couple's home to her husband when she 
entered a nursing home. She died without leaving a probate estate and her husband died soon 
thereafter. The county then sought recovery against Mr. Barg's estate for the amount of 
Medicaid benefits paid out on behalf of Mrs. Barg. The Barg Court determined that the county 
could recover only from assets that the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest in at the time of 
her death. Mrs. Barg had no legal interest in any property when she died because she had 
transferred her interests to her husband while she was alive. Therefore, the Court ruled that the 
county had no way to seek recovery from Mr. Barg's estate!2. [d. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota discussed 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) in depth. This 
discussion is directly applicable to the instant case because Idaho has adopted the federal 
language in that statute verbatim in I.e. § 56-218(4)(b). In discussing the statutes at issue the 
Court rejected the Department's argument that use of the word "assets" in 42 U.S.c. § 
1396p(b)(4)(B) permitted recovery against assets which the Medicaid recipient transferred inter 
vivos. The Barg Court also rejected the argument that the "other arrangement" phrase opened 
the door for the broader recovery allowed under Minnesota's statute. 
11 In this regard, IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 is just as impermissibly expansive as was the statute in Barg that the Court 
held was preempted by federal law. 
12 These are the same facts present in the instant case. Martha transferred her remaining interest in the couple's 
home to her husband in 2006, prior to applying for Medicaid benefits. She retained no legal interest in that real 
property, nor in the proceeds from the sale of that real property, which are the only assets that make up her 
husband's estate. 
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With the Court's indulgence, the Barg opinion is cited at length below because it is so 
directly on point with the case at bar. The Court stated in pertinent part, 
We turn to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a 
surviving spouse's estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent with 
federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 allows the state to recover 
from a surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were 
marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." 
(Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority 
does not conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 
1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993 amendments were intended to 
expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this argument for 
broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with 
the dual goals of federal law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance 
available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting community spouses from 
pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 
1396p(b)(1) allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 
1396p(b)(4) allows expansion of the estate only to include assets in which the 
recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" 
recovery allowed by subdivision 2 is preempted. 
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring 
the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language. 
Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-
1993 federal law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of 
assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but transferred by the 
recipient spouse prior to her death •... 
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional 
definition of "estate" allows inclusion of 
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the 
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, 
or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further 
describes the assets that a state may include in this expanded estate. The 
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clause describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," 
and second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are 
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers back to the immediately 
preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had 
any legal title or interest at the time of death." The including clause then 
describes to whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a "survivor, heir, 
or assign of the deceased individual." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, the 
clause describes several methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets 
might take place -- "through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." ld. 
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the 
recipient having a legal interest at the time of death. When we construe a 
federal statute we must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress 
used." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 
931 (1979). To read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime transfer would 
be to read the words "at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion 
that" other arrangement" cannot include lifetime transfers is further 
supported by the additional context. "[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of 
examples of conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients 
of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual," 
leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid recipient, must have died 
for the conveyance to occur. A recipient cannot have heirs or survivors 
during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the deceased" 
during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language and its 
context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that" other arrangement" is 
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did 
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the 
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at 
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from 
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death 
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every 
decision except Wirtz. to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to 
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the 
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold 
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it 
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the 
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recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time 
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to 
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis 
added) 
[d. at 68-71. 
The State of Minnesota filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking to 
overturn the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Barg. The U.S. Supreme Court issued an 
order inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States on the matter. 
Appendix 3, p. 1. In May of 2009, the U.S. Solicitor General submitted an amicus curiae brief 
authored by not only that office but joined by the attorneys from the Department of HHS in 
response to the U.S. Supreme Court's request. This is the most recent legal briefing by HHS 
on the issue. The United States' brief examines and rejects each and every argument posited by 
the State of Minnesota seeking to expand Medicaid estate recovery beyond that allowed by 
federal law. For the Court's convenience, the entire United States Solicitor General's amicus 
curiae brief is appended hereto as Appendix 3. 
The import of the United States' briefing in this matter cannot be overemphasized. The 
legal positions taken in that brief represent HHS' s reading of the federal law at issue in this case. 
CMS, as noted above, is governed by HHS. By accepting federal support for its Medicaid 
program, Idaho is legally obligated to abide by HHS/CMS's view of federal Medicaid law. 
Congress has extended HHS extremely broad authority in the Medicaid area. See Chevron and 
Blumer, supra. 
In its 2009 amicus brief, HHS expressly rejects the interpretation and rationale that the 
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Department relies upon in using I.C. § 56-218 to support the claim made against George's Estate. 
The United StateslHHS stated in pertinent part, 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision is correct and does not warrant 
further review. The federal Medicaid Act permits recovery of correctly paid 
benefits from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse, but limits that 
recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at 
the time of her death ... 
A. The Decision Of The Minnesota Supreme Court Is Correct 
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the 
Medicaid Act forbids petitioner from seeking to recover correctly paid 
benefits from assets in which the Medicaid recipient had no legal interest at 
the time of her death . 
. . . the Medicaid Act, which permits recovery only after the death of 
the recipient's surviving spouse, 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(2), authorizes a State to 
file a reimbursement claim against the surviving spouse's estate, up to the 
value of any assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the 
time of her death. 
The Minnesota estate-recovery law exceeds the scope of that 
authorization. It permits the State to recover from a surviving spouse's 
estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or 
jointly owned property at any time during the marriage, " Minn. Stat. Ann. § 
256B.15, subd. 2 (2007) (emphasis added), without regard to whether the 
recipient retained an interest in the assets at the time of her death. Because a 
State may not recover correctly paid Medicaid benefits except to the extent 
authorized by federal law, see 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(1), Minnesota's statute 
conflicts with federal law and is therefore preempted .... (emphasis added). 
Appendix 3, p. 8-9. The United States Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General's 
briefing/opinion on the matter. The Court decided not to grant cert in Barg. It is 
reasonable to assume the Court accepted the Solicitor General's view of the matter. 
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G. THE JACKMAN DECISION IS NEITHER CONTROLLING, NOR DISPOSITIVE. 
In 2005, this Court considered the Department's claim filed in the probate of a Medicaid 
recipient's estate whose spouse survived him. In Re Estate of Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436, 111 P. 
3d 121 (2005). In Kaminsky, the Court recognized that the Department's recovery claim was 
properly made only against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The Court stated, 
Only persons with few financial resources qualify for assistance and assistance 
comes with strings attached. Included in these strings is a right on the part of 
the State, pursuant to I.C. § 56-218, to obtain reimbursement of Medicaid 
assistance from the estate of a recipient. Under any reasonable definition, 
this right of recovery constitutes a "claim" against the recipient's estate. 
(emphasis added). 
Id. at 439. This is entirely consistent with federal law which sets forth a general rule of 
nonrecovery, and then provides an exception that is limited to recovery against the recipient's or 
the individual's estate. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1)13. In Wiggins, supra at 10, the District Court 
stated, "The Department admitted that the state and federal definitions of "estate" apply only to 
the "individual's" estate (i.e. recipient, not spouse of recipient)." 
i. The Jackman Decision Is A Pre-OBRA 1993 Case. This Court Has Never Ruled On The 
Post-OBRA 1993 Issue On Appeal. 
As it argued below, the Department's primary argument on appeal is that Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) is dispositive 
and supports its § 1396p(h) "asset" argument. Appellant's Brief, p. 13. Throughout this case 
the following points have emerged: 1) The Department cites and relies heavily upon a Jackman 
opinion that this Court withdrew. The withdrawn opinion is not Idaho law, has absolutely no 
13 It is a basic principle of statutory construction that the enumeration of exceptions in a statute is construed as an 
exclusion of all other exceptions. See e.g., Hines v. Department of Public Aid, 850 N.E.2d 148, 153 (Illinois 2006). 
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precedential value and is not binding upon this Court; and 2) The Department relies on dicta in 
the substituted and published Jackman decision to bootstrap itself into a position of arguing that 
somehow the law is settled in this area by the withdrawn Jackman opinion14. 
In its November 2, 1998 Jackman decision, the opinion clearly notes "Substitute Opinion 
The Court's Prior Opinion Dated June 16, 1998, Is Hereby Withdrawn." See Department Cases, 
p. 2; R., p. 441. The Internal Rules Of The Idaho Supreme Court, Rule 15(f) states in part: 
(f) Unpublished Opinions of the Court. ... If an opinion is not published, it 
may not be cited as authority or precedent in any court. (emphasis added). 
The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion was never published. The Court withdrew it and 
issued a substitute opinion. The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion may not be cited as authority or 
14 The briefing below created some confusion between pre-eligibility transfers and look-back rules with post-
eligibility rights. The look back period referred to in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c) applies when one spouse applies for 
Medicaid. Once one spouse qualifies for Medicaid, any resources belonging to the community or non-
recipient spouse are solely the property of that spouse and the non-recipient spouse can do whatever he wants 
with them. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4). 
The import of this statute was discussed in a June 29, 1999 letter to Idaho attorney Rod Gere from Robert Reed, 
Chief of the Medicaid Branch of the HHS Division of Medicaid and State Operations for Region X. This letter was 
copied to Karl Kurtz, then acting Director of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and stated in part, 
Thus, after the eligibility determination any resources belonging to the community spouse are 
solely the property of that spouse. That spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them, 
including leaving them, via a will, to particular heirs that do not include the institutionalized 
spouse. (emphasis added). 
The Department argued that this inquiry had to do with whether the Medicaid spouse was made ineligible by the 
non-recipient spouse's transfer of assets. While true, that point doesn't undercut the fact that CMS has stated the 
non-recipient spouse can do whatever they want with these assets post-eligibility, including leave assets to 
childrenlheirs via a Last Will & Testament upon death. This directly contradicts the Department's assertion that it 
has the right to capture those assets in an estate recovery claim. See also, AprilS, 2000 letter from Ronald Preston, 
HHS Associate Regional Administrator for Region I stating in part, 
Thus, after the month in which an institutionalized spouse is determined eligible for 
Medicaid, any resources belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that 
spouse. That is, the community spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them. 
(emphasis added) 
The above-cited HHS letters are attached hereto for the Court's convenience as Appendix 4. Federal law 
simply does not treat the property of the recipient and that of the non-recipient spouse as the same post-
eligibility. Of course, estate recovery only occurs post-eligibility. 
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precedent in this Court. Yet the Department cited the withdrawn opinion repeatedly before the 
Magistrate as well as the District Court and continues to rely on the withdrawn opinion15. 
R., p. 123-124,547,675. Appellant's Brief, p. 14, f.n. 5. The withdrawn Jackman opinion 
carries absolutely no weight on the issue before this Court. It certainly in no way establishes law 
in Idaho with regard to the federal law issue on appeal. Yet the Department would have this 
Court speculate as to what the Jackman Court would have opined had it ruled on the issue at bar, 
because of reasoning or rationale in an opinion that the Court never published and withdrew. 
The Department must continue to rely on the unpublished opinion, even though this is 
improper, in order to draw the "implication" it alone sees in the published decision. Throughout 
this case, starting with the magistrate, the Department has consistently ascribed a holding to 
Jackman that the Court simply did not make. The fundamental problem with the Department's 
reliance on the published Jackman decision is that the Court was dealing with a situation that 
pre-dated the OBRA-1993 amendments. This Court in Jackman stated repeatedly and was very 
careful to make sure that its opinion was restricted to the version of federal law applicable to the 
controversy before it - in other words the decision was applicable only to cases arising pre-
OBRA 1993. Jackman was explicitly restricted to the facts in that case. The Court made this 
very clear when it stated its holding that, "We conclude that section 56-218(1) of the Idaho Code 
(I.e.), as it existed at times applicable to this case, ... " (emphasis added). Jackman, supra at 
214. 
15 Despite the fact that the Department tries to explain away its citation to the withdrawn opinion, it continues to 
improperly rely on that opinion in violation of this Court's internal rule 15(t). Appellant's Brief, p. 14, fn. 5. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 22 
The Court also stated, 
We conclude that this [the post-OBRA 1993] definition of "assets" is not 
applicable to the agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and 
Hildor on March 8, 1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 
amendments to the federal statute does not apply "with respect to assets 
disposed of on or before the date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." 
Pub. L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, it [the post-OBRA 1993 definition of 
"assets"] does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department 
to recover the balance of Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. 
lackman, supra at 216. 
The Department contends that because the Court discussed the OBRA 1993 amendments 
that this somehow settles the issue. Justice Johnson's statements in lackman, upon which the 
Department so heavily relies, are simply dicta or dictum16• Justice Johnson's comments on how 
to interpret the post-OBRA amendments in federal law were not involved in nor necessary to the 
holding in the published lackman decision which was a pre-OBRA 1993 case. The Court says 
as much - repeatedly17. The Magistrate also appropriately recognized that lackman does not 
control this post-OBRA 1993 case and does not support the Department's misapplication of I.e. 
§ 56-218. The magistrate stated, 
16 "Dicta" is defined as, 
Opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the specific case before the 
court. Expressions in the court's opinion which go beyond the facts before court and therefore are 
individual views of author of opinion and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent. 
(emphasis added) 
Dictum is defined as foIlows: 
The word is generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum, ... Statements and comments in an 
opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to 
determination of the case in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. 
(emphasis added). 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1991). 
17 The Department admits as much when it states that, "there was no issue as to property transfers after October 1, 
1993" at issue in Jackman and the question before the Jackman Court "was not what Hildor [the Medicaid recipient] 
owned at death." (emphasis added). R., p. 546. 
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THE COURT ... I really have been struggling to deal with the definitions 
of estate and assets in both the state and federal's schemes .... I perceive the 
State as saying that Jackman [sic] allows the Court to look at any time, any 
period of time, in which the recipient of benefits had an interest in property .. 
. . I don't see that Jackman [sic] says that .... Because I think we've got to 
look at the published opinion, not the first one. What does that leave us. 
And I don't think it leaves us much. 
At least that's how it feels to me, that it doesn't necessarily say to me that 
the State may look to any period of time after 1993 that a Medicaid beneficiary, 
Medicaid recipient had an interest in property. I don't think it [Jackman] makes 
that determination .... I don't think it [Jackman] makes a determination of 
where in that period of time the estate may look at the recipient's interest in 
property. (emphasis added). 
Tr., p. 12, LL. 18 through p. 13, LL. 25. 
The District Court agreed stating, 
The State's reliance on Jackman is based largely on the original opinion in 
that case, which has since been substituted. The State urges this Court to consider this 
opinion, arguing that it clearly shows the court's intent to give "assets" a broad 
interpretation, and that the decision would have been different if the court had been able 
to apply the statutes in their current form. The Court does not agree. The full reasons 
for issuing a substitute opinion are not ascertainable by simple comparison of a substitute 
opinion. Given Internal Rule of the Idaho Supreme Court 15(f)'s prohibition against 
citation of unpublished opinions, the Court will not speculate about a withdrawn 
opinion to determine how the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes in 
question should be interpreted, or to determine the applicability of the preemption 
doctrine I 8. (emphasis added). 
R., p. 721. 
18 Most recently another Idaho district court, acting in its appellate capacity, came to the same conclusion. In 
Wiggins, the District Court rejected the Department's argument that Jackman decided this issue and stated, 
While the Supreme Court [in Jackman] did talk about the effect of the 1993 amendments in 
broadening the definition of "assets," that was not necessary to the Court's decision based on its 
reasoning. The Court was not presented directly with the question of whether, under the law as it now 
exists, federal law would trump state community property laws in making separate property liable for debts 
that could otherwise not be recovered from separate property. (emphasis added). 
/d. at 12. In other words, the Department is relying on dictum in the published Jackman decision. 
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No matter how much the Department would like to draw implications or 
speculate about the Jackman decision based on the unpublished opinion, the fact remains 
-Jackman does not control the outcome of this case. This Court should affirm the 
Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim, and do so unencumbered by the Department's 
efforts to shackle the Court's analysis with dicta from the Jackman opinion. 19 
H. FEDERAL LAW CONTAINED IN 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) IS CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS. THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM, BASED ON THE GENERAL 
DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" IN 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1), HAS NO MERIT. 
As noted above, federal law says nothing about allowing recovery from assets in which 
the Medicaid recipient does not have an interest at death. The U.S. Solicitor General's brief 
plainly rejects the Department's argument relying on the definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(h)(l) attempting to expand the scope of allowed recovery, stating, 
2. Petitioner [State of Minnesota] argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the 
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible recovery from the estate of the 
Medicaid recipient's surviving spouse, because the Act defines the term 
"assets" to include "all income and resources of the individual and of the 
individual's spouse." 42 U.S.c. 1396p(h)(1). According to petitioner, "[b]y 
including resources of both 'the individual' and 'of the individuals spouse' in 
the meaning of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's resources 
fall within the scope of § 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 27. 
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of 
"assets" does encompass resources of both "the individual" (i.e., the 
Medicaid recipient) and "The individual's spouse," the particular provision 
of the Medicaid Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in which 
19 Assuming arguendo that this Court concluded that the Jackman opinion's dicta upon which the Department relies 
was actually a holding in the case, the Court should still rule in the PR's favor for all the reasons urged by the PRo It 
is well past time for Idaho law to be brought into line with mandatory federal statutes which require that estate 
recovery in Idaho be limited to recovery against assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest in at death, as 
clearly defined in federal law. 
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the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.c. 
1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary to 
rewrite that clause to read "'any * * * assets in which [either or both the 
individual and the individual's spousel had any legal title or interest.'" Pet. 26 
(brackets and asterisk in original) (emphasis added). But this editing does 
nothing less than make the statute say the opposite of what it says. The plain 
language of the operative provision of the Act refutes petitioner's readings.2o 
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity about limiting spousal 
estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a 
legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption does 
not come into play, Pet. 28 ... (emphasis added). 
Appendix 3, U.S. Solicitor amicus brief, p. 10-12. 
The U.S. Solicitor General concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) "leaves no ambiguity 
about limiting spousal estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient had 
a legal interest at the time of death." ld. at 12. The point could not be more clear - the 
Department's argument that the general definition of "assets" contained in § 1396p(h) 
changes the plain wording in § 1396p(b)(4)(B) is incorrect. HHS spoke through its legal 
counsel to the U.S. Supreme Court as to its reading of this federal law. As noted above, a federal 
agency's reading of federal statutes is entitled to great weight and HHS has extremely broad 
authority in the Medicaid area. Chevron and Blumer, supra. 
20 (footnote 2 in the original amicus brief) In describing the operation of the amended estate-recovery provision, the 
legislative history of the 1993 amendments also focused on the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid 
benefits, rather than the resources of both the individual and his or her spouse. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, l03d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1993) ("At the option of the State, the estate against [which] * * * recovery is sought may 
include any real or personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time 
of death, including the home.") (emphasis added) (footnote original) 
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i. Basic Rules Of Statutory Construction Support The Magistrate's Decision. 
Applying well-established rules of statutory construction also supports the conclusion 
that the Department's position is without merit. Subsection 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)'s definition 
of "estate" is specific to "this subsection" meaning subsection (b) of 42 U.S. C. § 1396p. In 
contrast, subsection 42 U .S.c. § 1396p(h)( 1)' s definition of "assets" applies generally to "this 
section (i.e. all of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p) and is included in the "definitions" section at the end of the 
statute. When interpreting statutory definitions and provisions, specific definitions take 
precedence over general definitions21. 
The more specific definition of "estate" under (b)(4) supplants or takes precedence over 
the broader, more general definition of assets in (h)(l), thereby imposing limits on what is 
recoverable in Medicaid recovery actions. The Department's interpretation attempts to reverse 
this, and superimpose the general definition of "assets" improperly upon the specific definition 
of "estate" that applies in 42 U.S. C. § 1396p(b)( 4 )(B). The Solicitor General explicitly rejected 
this flawed statutory analysis 22. The Department's reliance on the definition of "asset" in § 
1396p(h) to supplant and in essence re-write the specific definition of the word "estate" in § 
1396p(b)(4) is simply without merit. 
21 See e.g., In re Drainage District No.3, 40 Idaho 549, 553, 235 P.2d 895 (1925), citing Sutherland on Statutory 
Construction, sec. 387. 
22 The application of a more general definition of "assets" makes sense in other subsections in § I 396p that do not 
contain a specific definition of an applicable term used in the particular subsection itself, as does § 1396p(b)(4)'s 
definition of "estate." For instance, 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c), entitled "Taking into account certain transfers of assets" 
contains the Medicaid asset transfer penalty rule that applies in eligibility determinations. The application of the 
general definition of the word "asset" in § 1396p(h) makes sense when applied to § 1396p(c)'s use of that term for 
two reasons: I) an asset transfer penalty applies when determining Medicaid eligibility no matter which spouse 
transferred the asset; and 2) § 1396p(c) does not contain language defming a term used in that particular subsection 
as does § I 396p(b )( 4) definition of the term "estate". 
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ii. Wirtz Is An Anomoly That Should Not Be Followed In Idaho. Its Unpersuasive 
Reasoning Has Been Roundly Rejected. 
The Department cites In re Estate a/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000) indicating that 
the North Dakota Supreme Court "relied on this same reasoning" to uphold a recovery claim. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 14. Jackman cannot be cited for the proposition the Department would like 
to cite it for (i.e. the unpublished opinion), so that leaves Wirtz standing alone. 
The Department does not assert the same position that the Wirtz court relied upon to 
justify its decision. The Wirtz court did not rely on the definition of "assets" in § 1396p(h). The 
Wirtz court reached the result it sought on a finding that the words "interest" and "other 
arrangement" in § 1396p(b)(4)(B) were ambiguous, allowing it to "resort to extrinsic aids to 
ascertain the legislative intent" and thereby rewrite the statutory language. Wirtz, supra at 885. 
Recognizing the clear weight of cogent, well-reasoned authority, the Magistrate rejected 
the untenable "asset" definition argument and the Wirtz reasoning. The Magistrate stated, 
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate 
because Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's 
spouse; 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of 
"estate" and 42 U.S.c. 1396p(h)(1) says "assets" includes property that a person 
transferred to her spouse. The court cannot accept this interpretation. 
The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in 
Estate a/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received 
Medicaid benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the 
estate of Vema Witz [sic], Clarence's wife. The Wirtz court analyzed the federal 
statutory definitions of "estate" and "asset" as quoted above and held that" ... any 
assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Vema Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's death 
are subject to the department's recovery claim." Id. at 886. This ruling depends, 
however, on an awkward interpretation of the term "other arrangement" in 42 
U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota court in Wirtz interpreted the "other 
arrangement" language independently from the rest of the section. The bulk of 
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the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fashion on the 
death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfers and life estates. 
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of 
property of this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context 
of the surrounding language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include 
transfers of a similar, automatic nature not any possible transfer. (emphasis 
original). 
R., p. 508-509. The District Court also rejected the Wirtz court's reasoning, stating, "The 
Court first considered the plain language contained in the provisions, which it found 
unambiguous." (emphasis added). R., p. 720. 
The Magistrate went on to note that the Minnesota Supreme Court in Barg, supra at 71, 
provided a "more reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory language." Id. The Barg 
Court thoroughly discussed and rejected Wirtz stating, 
.. . Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow 
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed 
that authority to extend to assets that were transferred before the death of 
the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993 
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate oj Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 
882, 885-86 (N.D.2000) .... 
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other 
than the Medicaid recipient's estate have construed that authority to reach only 
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, that 
is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state 
probate law or included in the estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 
1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 (limiting 
recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate 
law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that 
recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid recovery 
statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid 
recipient's estate as defined under state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 
at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of 'estate' in [section] 
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits 
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the time of death'''); see also In re 
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Estate afSmith, No. M2005-0I41O-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4 
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.l, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery 
against estates of surviving spouses have required that recipient had interest in 
assets at time of death) .... 
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting 
principle requiring an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. . .. Concluding 
that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied 
on the Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking 
Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86 .... 
We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 
amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied in Wirtz. The plain meaning of 
"other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is 
arrangements other than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the 
time of the Medicaid recipient's death •... 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did 
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the 
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at 
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from 
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death 
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every 
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to 
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the 
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold 
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it 
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the 
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time 
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to 
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis 
added) 
Barg, supra at 68-71 23 . No court addressing a post-OBRA 1993 estate recovery claim 
has accepted and followed the Wirtz rationale. The Wirtz court's reasoning is 
23 See also, In re Estate of Smith, (Tenn.App. 2006) ("We must respectfully disagree with the rationale of Wirtz 
since under 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)( 4)(B), in order to be potentially recoverable, an asset must be one in which the 
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indefensible and this Court distinguishes itself by joining the chorus of other decisions 
that have rejected it. 
iii. Neither I.e. § 56-218 Nor The Department's Regulations Change Community 
Property Law In Idaho. 
In prior briefing, the Department has tried to prop up Wirtz by arguing that the 
Solicitor General mentioned that Wirtz may not be inconsistent with Barg because the 
Wirtz decision may be due to "different views of when, under state law, a spouse retains a 
legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse." R., p. 680; Solicitor General 
amicus brief, supra at p. 14. Federal law limits the scope of estate recovery to assets in 
which the Medicaid recipient has an interest in at death. State law then enters into the 
analysis to determine whether the Medicaid recipient retained an interest in any assets at 
death. 
Idaho law stands for the proposition that when someone completely divests 
themselves of property during their lifetime, they do not retain any legal title or interest in 
that property at the time of their death. The Magistrate so held when he stated, 
. " When making a claim against the estate of a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the 
Department may only recover against property in which the recipient spouse had 
an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry conveyed all of her interest 
in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was no joint tenancy, right of 
survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have conveyed any interest 
recipient had a 'legal title or interest at the time of death. '''). 
The North Dakota Supreme Court is the only court to deviate from this limiting principle requiring 
an interest at the time of death. In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 2000), held that any 
assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to his or her spouse before the recipient's death were subject to 
recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, relying on Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states 
wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." [d. at 885-86. (emphasis added). 
32 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 498,515 (ABA, July/August 2008). 
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in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The Department may not 
recover Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the proceeds from the sale of this 
property. (emphasis added). 
R., p. 510. The District Court agreed stating, 
The State disputes the magistrate and personal representative's 
interpretation, which places emphasis on the phrases limiting the property and 
assets of the recipient of benefits held "at the time of death." The magistrate 
found that this definition of "estate" did not permit a state agency to look back 
and recover property interests that the recipient divested prior to death. This 
Court agrees. The language and definition of "estate" is broad, and includes all 
interests, including any which may have automatically transferred upon the death 
of the recipient. However, it goes without saying that where a recipient has 
long ago been divested of any particular interest, it would not fall within that 
individual's estate. Moreover, nothing in this provision [42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(4)] seeks to preserve interests that were divested well before death, 
something which the drafters were clearly able to articulate in those 
provisions dealing with Medicaid eligibility requirements24. 
R., p. 711-712. 
In the proceedings below the Department argued that I.C. § 56-218(4) actually 
changed marital property law in Idaho. R., p. 688. In Wiggins, supra, the district court 
expressly rejected this same argument stating, 
It appears from a plain reading of this section [I.e. § 56-218(4)] that the 
recipient's estate includes not only property in which the recipient had a legal 
interest but also property which passed by operation of law to someone else at the 
time of the recipient's death. Neither of those circumstances would include 
24 The district court also correctly observed, 
Indeed, when addressing the eligibility requirements for assistance, under § 1396p(c)(l)(A), the drafters 
made those who transfer property "for less than fair market value" ineligible for assistance. The State 
argues it would be absurd to prohibit the recipient and/or recipient's spouse from disposing of assets below 
market value in eligibility determinations, while allowing assets to be transferred at no cost post-eligibility 
for purposes of avoiding reimbursement or recovery payments in probate. However, § 1396p(c)( l)(A) 
deals specifically with eligibility, not recovery. Had the drafters sought to include this same provision in 
the area of probate and recovery matters, they easily could have made such a distinction. (emphasis added). 
Id. 
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property which the recipient had sold, given away or transferred prior to 
death ... 
Part of the difficulty is that the Department's interpretation of what 
should be included in the recipient's estate ignores Idaho community 
property law and does not address the impact of having separate property in the 
recipient spouse's estate. Indeed, in its brief, the Department asserts that I.e. 
§ 56-218(1) "effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to 
the property of Medicaid recipients and their spouses." There is no 
indication in this statute that the Idaho legislature intended such a sweeping 
change by simpl! authorizing the State to assert a claim against a recipient's 
spouse's estate.2 (emphasis added). 
Appendix 2, p. 6-7. The Department is asking this Court to change basic principles of 
Idaho community property law to permit the claim it makes against George's Estate. 
There is no legal justification for this result. 
I. THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT. 
The Department has repeatedly invited the lower courts to engage in a policy 
debate on the intent behind the federal law, and the PR anticipates it will do so again in 
its Reply Brief. R, pgs. 531-532;534-535;541;666-668;671-672;676-677;689. The 
Department's opinion of public policy, Congressional intent, or the purpose of the 
Medicaid statutes is irrelevant. This Court need not, indeed may not, engage in policy 
interpretations when faced with clear, unambiguous federal statutes. 
25 In Wiggins, the Department also "admitted that it cannot pursue property that has always been the separate 
property of the recipient's spouse (even though this contradicts the Department's argument that I.e. § 56-218 
broadly allows recovery against both spouses' estates)." ld. at 8. The Department then raised IDAPA 
16.03.09.900.20 and 16.03.09.900.24 as justification for its position, just as it does in the case at bar. The District 
Court was not persuaded, stating, "At oral argument the Department was unable to justify the reasoning or logic to 
support its position that some separate property of the recipient's spouse is liable to the State while other separate 
property is not (apart from the Rule mentioned above)." ld. at 9. 
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Analysis of a statute or regulation always begins with the literal language of the 
enactment. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197,46 
P.3d 9, 14 (2002) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has established that it 
will not look to the legislative intent of a regulation where the express written 
language of the regulation is unambiguous. Friends of Farm to Market, 137 
Idaho at 197,46 P.3d at 14 (citing Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175,560 P.2d 497 
(1977». "Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to 
construe the language." Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, then a 
court may not interpret the language to include an unwritten legislative intent. 
Stafford, supra at 464-465. As Minnesota's Supreme Court noted in discussing the same types 
of policy arguments made by the Department in this case, "[that] argument would take us too far 
down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its 
language." Barg, supra at 69. 
J. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE MAGISTRATE'S HOLDING THAT 
GEORGE, AS HIS WIFE'S AGENT, HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN THE 
REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER AT ISSUE ON HER BEHALF26. 
i. The Conveyance At Issue Was "For Value Received." The Deed Speaks For Itself. 
26 The power of attorney issue discussed in this section is not determinative of the estate recovery/federal law 
preemption issues raised in this appeal. The Department argues that "if Martha still had an interest in the property at 
the time of her death, then the second issue, relating to preemption, is never reached." Appellant's Brief, p. 5. 
This is incorrect. No matter how the Court rules on the power of attorney issue, it still must reach the PR's 
argument that the Department's claim in this case is impermissibly broad and that Idaho estate recovery law 
conflicts with federal law and is preempted by federal law. 
It is not disputed that Martha owned the couple's home as her separate property prior to her marriage to 
George. R., p. 133. It is also undisputed that on November 18,2002, Martha executed a deed conveying a Y2 
interest in the home to her husband George. R., p. 134-135. The Department has never challenged the legal efficacy 
of this transfer. On July 31, 2006, Martha conveyed her remaining interest in the home to George, at which time the 
home became George's separate property. I.C. §§ 32-903,32-906. The Department challenges George's authority 
to engage in this conveyance for Martha. 
The legal effect of a finding that George did not have the authority to convey Martha's remaining interest 
in the home to himself would be that Martha retained that interest. Yet the Department's claim seeks to recover 
against the entire value of the house sale proceeds, not just a Y2 interest in those proceeds. This claim exceeds what 
Martha owned or had title to at her death, even assuming arguendo that this Court held that George did not have the 
authority to engage in the transfer at issue. Therefore, no matter how the Court rules on the power of attorney issue, 
it must still resolve the estate recovery/federal law preemption issues. 
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Both the Magistrate and District Court found that the among the powers sufficient to 
authorize George to act for Martha in signing the July 31,2006 was paragraph A, which included 
expansive real property powers. Paragraph (A) entitled "Real property transactions" authorized 
George to deal with her real property, 
on such terms and conditions ... as my Agent shall deem proper; and to ... convey ... 
and in any way or manner deal with all or any part of any interest in real property 
whatsoever, including specifically, but without limitation, real property lying and being 
situated in the State of Idaho, under such terms and conditions ... as my Agent shall 
deem proper. 
The Magistrate ruled from the bench on the power of attorney issue stating, 
The power of attorney issue was - is interesting to me and ... 
when everything - all of the language in that power of attorney is considered, 
it's so - the intent that you just can't get around is that document was 
entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as possible, it seems to 
me, including the right to deal with interest in real property. 
So I'm going to make a determination for purposes of this case that 
that is a valid power of attorney for purposes of dealing with - including 
giving Martha Perry's interest in that property. 
So I'm going to decide that question for purposes of this case. (emphasis 
added) 
Tr., p. 11, LL. 8-25; p. 12, LL. 1-11; Magistrate Court Tr., p. 4. The District Court 
concluded, 
Paragraph A of the power of attorney allowed George to convey Martha's interests 
in real property as he deemed proper. The power of attorney was executed in 2005 
prior to the enactment of the current Uniform Power of Attorney Act, Idaho Code § 15-
12-101 et seq., in 2008. The present act requires express authority to make gifts, but it is 
not applicable here. No authority has been cited requiring such language prior to the 
adoption of the act. (emphasis added) 
R., p. 709. 
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For the first time in its briefing before this Court, the Department cites an A.L.R. treatise 
for the general proposition that consideration must inure to the principal when general real 
property powers are utilized by an agent to convey property. Appellant's Brief, p. 8. This 
caused PR's counsel to review once again the deed's language. The July 31,2006 deed states in 
pertinent part, 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Martha Jean Perry, Grantor, does hereby convey, 
release, remise and forever quitclaim until George D. Perry, whose address is 2104 
Tendoy Drive, Boise, ID 83705, the following described premises, to-wit: .... This deed 
in intended to convey to the Grantee all right, title, and interest of the Grantor in and to 
said property, now owned or hereinafter acquired. (emphasis original). 
R., p. 99. This was not a gift deed. The word "gift" was not used at all. To the contrary, this 
was a conveyance for consideration, as plainly stated on the face of the deed. 
At the beginning of the hearing before the magistrate, Judge Bieter inquired as to whether 
he could decide the matter on the evidence submitted. Both counsel stipulated that no 
evidentiary hearing was necessary and the matter could be ruled upon based on the documents 
submitted into evidence. The parties proceeded on that basis. The Department raised no 
objection to admission of the July 31,2006 deed. Tr., p. 3, LL. 3 - p. 5, LL. 18. Magistrate 
Court Tr., p. 2. 
The Department has consistently challenged George's authority to sign the deed for 
Martha, not the deed itself. The Department has never raised any issue with regard to the deed's 
validity or delivery. The Department has always contended the conveyance was a gift and that 
Martha's power of attorney was ineffective to allow George to sign the deed because the power 
of attorney did not contain what the Department considered to be adequate gifting authority. 
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In Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 174, 898 P.2d 1081 (1995), the Court found the deed 
language "ONE DOLLAR and OTHER GOOD and VALUABLE CONSIDERATION" to be 
unambiguous. The Court cited Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483,484, 777 P.2d 255 (1989) for the 
holding that where a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be 
determined from the deed itself. The deed at issue in Hall actually contained the exact same 
language as does the July 31,2006 deed at issue here. The Hall Court stated, "Where, as here, 
the consideration clause clearly recites that the transfer was made "For Value Received," parol 
evidence is not admissible to contradict the deed by attempting to show the transfer was in part a 
fI gift" rather than "for value. II (emphasis added). Id. 
As noted above, the Department stipulated to the admission of the deed and did not raise 
any challenge to the consideration clause in the deed or seek to introduce evidence for any 
purpose on this issue. This case is unlike Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21,232 P.3d 799 (2010), 
or the cases cited therein, where the Court held that evidence beyond a deed was admissible to 
show or disprove transmutation. The Department conceded the home was George's separate 
property if the conveyance was effective. Tr., p. 11, LL. 22-25. The consideration clause, as in 
Hall, is clear and unambiguous. The deed speaks for itself. The Department's claim that 
Martha's power of attorney was inadequate because it lacked gifting powers fails entirely 
because the deed itself establishes that the conveyance was "for value received" and thus not a 
gift at aU27 . The fact that the deed language -- never contested by either party -- establishes that 
27 In briefing before the district court, the PR argued that the Department was precluded from raising a new issue on 
appeal because the Department relied on a statute that it had not relied on below. R., p. 598. The Department 
responded, 
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the conveyance was "for value received" and was not a gift at all is relevant to the Court's 
consideration of whether the provisions in the power of attorney are legally adequate to empower 
George to convey Martha's remaining interest in the home to himself. 
ii. Martha's Power Of Attorney Was More Than Sufficient To Allow George To Transfer 
Martha's Interest In The Property To Himself. 
This Court should find that Martha's power of attorney was more than adequate. 
Martha's power of attorney is incredibly comprehensive. It starts out stating in all capital letters 
that the "powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." The power of attorney then 
goes into great detail explaining a very wide variety of powers that are granted to George, as 
agent. Paragraph (A) entitled "Real property transactions" is cited above. The authority granted 
under this paragraph also includes the authority to "cancel" notes, mortgages, security interest, or 
deeds to secure debt, which is equivalent to "giving away" assets of the principal, should that 
even be an issue. 
Martha's power of attorney also includes, under paragraph (H), entitled "Estate, trust, and 
other beneficiary transactions" the power "To •.. exercise ... any .•. gift ••• for the 
The personal representative is confusing "issue" with "authorities." The issue has always been the same: 
Whether Martha's property conveyed by George to himself is subject to recovery. The Department is 
merely citing additional authorities relating to this issue. If additional authorities could not be cited 
much of the Respondent's Brief would have to be excluded. (emphasis added) 
R., p. 686. 
The Department's analysis is apt and applies to the July 31, 2006 deed. The issue remains the same-
whether Martha's power of attorney gave George the requisite authority to convey Martha's interest in the home to 
himself. The PR is simply presenting additional legal authority which supports the legal conclusion that the deed 
was for consideration and not a gift. The deed itself was properly admitted before the magistrate and has been in 
evidence throughout this case. 
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principal.,,28 Martha expressly authorized George as her agent to make gifts on her behalf. By 
including the qualifier that George, as agent, may exercise "any gift" on her behalf, Martha 
broadened that power to authorize George to make gifts to any person, including himself. The 
Magistrate held that although this language was not the "clearest kind of authority" he held that 
the gifting language in paragraph H "certainly can be read that way." Tr., p. 11, LL. 12-13; 
Magistrate Court Tr., p. 4. Martha's power of attorney satisfied I.C. § 32-912, if that statute is 
even relevant (see discussion below)?9 
The gifting authority that Martha gave to George must also be read in conjunction with 
the other powers Martha granted to her husband, specifically the power to exercise all powers 
with respect to Medicaid" that she could exercise. Paragraph (K) entitled, "Benefits from Social 
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, or other governmental programs, or military service" authorizes 
Martha's husband as her agent 
"To ... file ... claims to any benefit or assistance under any federal, state, local 
or foreign statute; and in general, exercise all powers with respect to •.• 
government benefits, including but not limited to Medicare and Medicaid, 
which the principal could exercise if present and under no disability. 
(emphasis added). 
Conveying the Medicaid spouse's interest in the couple's home to the community spouse 
is expressly sanctioned by federal law and typical in cases of married couples where one spouse 
28 The full sentence that contains this language states, "To accept, receipt for, exercise, release, reject, renounce, 
assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or 
payment due or payable to or for the principal." (emphasis added). 
29The fact that a title company required the PR to sign off on the closing statement for Martha is not equivalent to a 
legal finding that Martha's power of attorney was somehow deficient, as the Department implies. Appellant's Brief, 
p. 11. That signature requirement is simply the title insurer covering its bases because the couple was married at the 
time of the closing and Martha was still alive. It is standard procedure for a title insurer to have both spouses sign 
off as a liability avoidance precaution. 
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is qualifying for Medicaid benefits. Martha's power of attorney not only contemplated that her 
agentlhusband could make such an interspousal transfer, it expressly authorized it. The 
combination of the comprehensive power to "exercise any gift" and the comprehensive power to 
"exercise all powers with respect to ... Medicaid" and "real property transactions" expressly 
establishes that George acted well within his authority as Martha's agent in executing the deed 
that the Department challenges. 
The Department cites a number of cases to support its argument that Martha's power of 
attorney was somehow insufficient. Appellant's Brief, p. 7-9. All of these cases are easily 
distinguishable from the instant case. In none of those cases did the power of attorney contain 
the specific gifting and Medicaid planning language that Martha's power of attorney contains. In 
none of those cases did the power of attorney contain any gifting language whatsoever. In none 
of those cases was an interspousal transfer at issue. In none of those cases was Medicaid at 
issue. In addition, every case the Department cites involved agents who were not spouses. In 
the Department's cited cases, the non-spouse agents were conveying assets to themselves or to 
other third parties, often in contravention of the principal's estate distribution plan or somehow 
in contravention to what the principal would have intended. 
In this case, Martha's agent was her husband, conveying Martha's remaining interest in a 
home in which he was residing, to himself, while his wife was in a nursing home. Martha had 
already taken action to put George's name on the title herself, indicating her intent he have 
ownership in the home. George was the natural object of Martha's bounty. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 40 
The interspousal transfer makes sense and was contemplated by the power of attorney 
Martha put in place specifically to allow such actions. There simply are no concerns present in 
this case regarding financial abuse of the principal, negation of the principal's estate plan or 
fraud on the principal as was at issue in the authorities the Department relies upon. 
"Powers of attorney are to be construed in accordance with the rules of interpretation of 
written instruments generally .... ,,30 In construing a written instrument, a court must consider 
it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible.31 "The 
intention of the donor or grantor is to be gathered from the instrument of creation.,,32 Reading 
Martha's power of attorney in its entirety, one is struck by the comprehensiveness of the 
document. In addition to the introductory language indicating that the powers conveyed to 
George are broad and all-encompassing, the powers under each paragraph provide great detail 
emphasizing and underscoring that conclusion33. 
iii. Martha's Power Of Attorney Met The Requirements Of I.e. § 15-5-501 et seq. 
30 3 AmJur.2d Agency § 30, at 533-34 (1986). 
31 Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Insurance Fund, /35 Idaho 434,437, 18 P.3d 956 (2000), citing Magic Valley 
Radiology Associates, PA v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 565, 808 P.2d 1303, 1310(1991). 
32 49 CJ. §§ 34,40. See also 72 C.J.S. Powers § 22 (1951) 
33 Paragraph (B) entitled "Tangible personal property transactions" includes the power to, 
in any way or manner deal with all or any part of any real or personal property whatsoever, 
tangible or intangible, or any interest therein, that I own at the time of execution or may thereafter 
acquire, under such terms and conditions, and under such covenants, as my Agent shall deem 
proper." (emphasis added). 
Paragraph (H), discussed above, also includes language granting the agent power to " ... in general, exercise all 
powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could exercise if present and under no disability." The 
other paragraphs in Martha's power of attorney consistently imbue George with authority to act with total and 
absolute discretion. The Department's counsel actually agreed with this conclusion when he stated at the hearing 
before the magistrate, " ... this is a very comprehensive power of attorney." Tr., p. 7, LL. 5-6; Magistrate Court Tr., 
p.3. 
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I.C. § 15-5-501 et seq. was in effect at the time Martha signed the power of attorney and 
governs that document. I.C. § 15-5-502 stated in pertinent part, 
All acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during 
any period of disability or incapacity of the principal have the same effect and ... 
bind the principal and his successors in interest, as if the principal were competent 
and not disabled. 
Martha's power of attorney meets all of the requirements of I.C. § 15-5-501. I.e. § 15-5-
501 does not mandate that Martha was required to use any specific language or "terms of art" in 
order to imbue her spouse/agent with the requisite authority to make the interspousal transfer at 
issue34. Yet as discussed above, the power of attorney does contain such language and is 
completely sufficient under the law then in effect to allow George to sign the deed for Martha. 
iv. The Department's I.e. § 32-912 Argument Is Without Merit. 
I.C. § 32-906(2) entitled, "Community Property - Income From Separate and Community 
Property - Conveyance Between Spouses", states in pertinent part, 
Property conveyed by one spouse to the other shall be presumed to be the sole and 
separate estate of the grantee and only the grantor spouse need execute and 
acknowledge the deed or other instrument of conveyance notwithstanding the 
provisions of section 32-912, Idaho Code; ... 
I.C. § 32-912 "evinces a legislative policy of protecting community real property from creditors, 
unless both spouses agree in writing to incur the debt.,,35 I.C. § 32-912 is not designed to address 
34 The district court agreed stating, 
Paragraph A of the power of attorney allowed George to convey Martha's interests in real property as he 
deemed proper. The power of attorney was executed in 2005 prior to the enactment of the current Uniform 
Power of Attorney Act, Idaho Code § 15-12-101 et seq., in 2008. The present act requires express 
authority to make gifts, but it is not applicable here. No authority has been cited requiring such 
language prior to the adoption of the act. (emphasis added). R., p. 709. 
35 Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 713, 779 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1989) 
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interspousal transfers. Pursuant to I.e. § 32-906(2), George signing the deed as agent for Martha 
was all that was required, notwithstanding I.e. § 32-91236. 
v. The Magistrate Made Findings of Fact On The Power Of Attorney Issue Which 
Support The Legal Conclusion That The Power of Attorney Was Sufficient As A Matter Of 
Law. 
The Department argues that "the Magistrate's discussion of this issue ... is confined to a 
footnote.,,37 Appellant's Brief, p. 5. The Magistrate's legal conclusion as stated in the Order 
Disallowing Claim was supported by explicit findings of fact made at the hearing. There is no 
prohibition against a magistrate making oral findings of fact38. The Magistrate's findings are 
cited above and found at Tr., p. 11, LL. 8-25; p. 12, LL. 1-11; Magistrate Court Tr., p. 4. 
The Magistrate clearly ruled not only that paragraph H in the power of attorney was 
sufficient, but also that the comprehensive nature of the document supported a conclusion that 
Martha's power of attorney gave George sufficient authority to legally effectuate the interspousal 
transfer. The Magistrate found as a matter of fact that Martha intended to give George the 
necessary authority in the power of attorney to transfer the property to himself and found that the 
power of attorney was sufficient, as a matter of law, to allow George the authority to make the 
interspousal transfer at issue. The district court affirmed this ruling and so should this Court. 
36 Throughout this proceeding the PR has asserted that an alternative ground to sustain Martha's power of attorney 
applied in this case -- common law interspousal agency. The PR reiterates that argument based on Lowry v. Ireland 
Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 713, 779 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1989), wherein this Court stated that "an agency may be ... 
inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties." citing Noble. 91 Idaho at 368, 421 P.2d at 448 (1966) 
(existence of the wife's agency was a question of fact to be determined by the finder of the facts from the husband's 
and wife's dealings, circumstances, and conduct). Martha's actions in putting the power of attorney in place, the 
comprehensive language it contains, and the Magistrate's factual findings (discussed below), supports this Court 
affirming the interspousal conveyance based on the alternative ground of common law interspousal agency. 
37 This same argument was made below and rebutted below. The Department once again ignores what occurred at 
the hearing. The District Court also discussed this same point in her Order. R., p. 708. 
38 See e.g., State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 776, 992 P.2d 769 (1999) 
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K. THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(5) and I.e. § 12-117, the PR claims attorney fees on appeal. The 
Department's appeal lacks any reasonable basis in fact or in law. Neither federal law, nor I.C. § 
56-218(4)(b), which mirrors federal law, permits the Department's claim against property in 
which the Medicaid recipient has no title or interest at the time of her death. The plain, 
unambiguous language of these statutes supports this conclusion. If this was not enough, the 
Court's decision In re: Barg, decided July of 2008, and the U.S. Solicitor General's opinion 
issued May of 2009, clearly put the Department on notice that the type of claim made in this case 
was impermissibly broad and violated federal law. The Department has chosen to pursue this 
appeal by asserting an erroneous interpretation of clear, unambiguous federal and state statutory 
language, thereby justifying an award to the Estate of attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Personal Representative respectfully requests that the 
Court affirm the Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim in its entirety and award the Estate 
attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 19th day of September, 2011. 
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Attorney for Personal Representative 
Estate of George D. Perry 
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Case No. CV 2009-1926 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM 
AGAINST TI-IE ESTATE 
Hearing on the Department of Health & Welfare's petition for allowance of a 
claim against the estate of Vivian M. Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins was heard on the 
.... 
3rd day of February 2010. Corey Cartwright appeared on behalf of the claimant, the 
Department of Health & Welfare. The personal representative Lynn Wiggins appeared 
and was represented by R. Brad Masingill. 
Bach:ground 
A joint estate was opened May 21, 2009, pursuant to Idaho Code 15-3-111. On 
November 23,2009 the Department of Health & Welfare filed a claim (pursuant to Idaho 
Code 15-3-804) against the estate for medical assistance paid on behalf of the decedent 
Vivian M. Wiggins in the amount of $264,674.45 made pursuant to Idaho Code 56 .. 218. 
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The personal representative filed a Notice of Disallowance of the claim pursuant 
to Idaho Code 15-3-806 on November 30~ 2009. The claimant filed a Petition for 
Allowance of Claim pursuant to Idaho Code 15w3 .. 806 on December 1, 2009. 
The parties stipulated to the following facts: 
1. TIle Department of Health & Welfare treated Vivian Wiggins and 
Emerson Wiggins as though they had a Man-iage Settlement Agreement 
(hereinafter MSA) which divided their assets. 
2. The MSA transmutted Vivian W~gins and Emerson Wiggin's community 
property to separate property. 
3. Although no executed copy or original MSA was presented to the court~ 
the parties agreed that one was executed in 2002. 
4. The first application for Medicaid Assistance took place in 2002 and the 
second occurred August 27,2003. 
5. Unless the MSA had been execl.lted, Vivian Wiggins would not have been 
eligible for Medicaid Benefits. 
6. Plaintiff's Exhibits A through G were admitted; they support the amount 
claimed by the Department $264,674.45 that was paid on behalf of Vivian 
Wiggins and has not been recovered; and, that a Notice of a Statutory 
Claim regarding the Estate of Vivian Wiggins was scnt to the Personal 
Representative on March 5,2009 (Plaintiff's Exhibit B). 
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The court further finds based on the pleadings that Vivian and Emerson Wiggins 
were married at the time of Vivian's death. Vivian M Wiggins died on the 30th day of 
January 2009. Emerson Dale Wiggins died on F"ebruary 9) 2009. 
The personal representative did not contest the amount of the claim or that the 
Medicaid funds were expended for the care of Vivian Wiggins. 
The assets in the joint estate were the separate property of Emerson Wiggins. 
The Department did not challenge the vaHdity of the MSA, even though no 
original or copy of the original was delivered to the CO\lrt and no proof was made that the 
MSA conlplied with Idaho Code sections 32-916 et. Seq. The Department has not 
brought any action in the district court to challenge the MSA. 
Issue 
May the Department recover Medicaid benefits paid for Vivian's care from the 
separate property of her husband, Emerson? 
Idaho Code 56-218 provides for the recovery of Medicaid benefits from the 
estates of deceased Medicaid recipients and their spouses. Idaho Code 56 .. 2 J 8 provides; 
(1) Recovery of Certain Medicaid Assistance - (1) Except where exempted or 
waived in accordance with federal law, medical assistance pursuant to this chapter 
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when 
the individual received such assistance, may be recovered from the individuals 
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both: 
The Department argues that the legal basis for its claim against Emerson's 
separate property is Idaho Department of Ilealth and Welfare v. Jackman 132 Idaho 213 
(1998). That case parallels this case factually, Jackman's holding is that the Department 
is not limited to the estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may 
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recover amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that: (1) "if the estate of the individual who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate 
to repay the full amount of the assistance received, the Department can recover the 
balance from the estate of the surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in effect when 
recipient and her husband entered into marital settlement agreement transmitting most of 
recipient's and husband's community property into separate property of husband, limited 
the Department to recovering any community property recipient and husband may have ... 
accumulated after the agreement. 
In this matter the personal representative for the estate denied the claim because 
the claim to recover for benefits paid on behalf of Vivian Wjggins was made against 
property which pursuant to the MSA would be the separate property of Emerson 
Wiggins. 
The Department argues that recovery against the separate property of Emerson 
should be allowed because the MSA between Emerson and Vivian occurred in 2002 after 
the law applicable in Jackman was amended to include a more expansive definition of 
"estate" and "asset", In Jackman the parties entered into a MSA in April of 1993 and the 
Federal Law was amended in October of 1993 (OBRA 93). 
The Departmenfs claim relics on an interpretation of the definition of "estate" 
and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes amended in October of 1993. 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b)(4) provides: 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased 
individual-
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(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual; s estate, as defined for plllposes of State pro hate Jaw; and -
(8) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and personal property 
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the 
time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed 
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, surVivorship, life estate, living, or other arrangement. 
The term "asset" is defined in 42 U.s.C. 1396(11): 
(1) The term "asset", with respect to an individual, includes all income and 
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any 
income or l'esources which the individual or such individual's spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, ... 
The Department argues that it doesn't matter whether the property is Emerson's 
separate property or not because the Department may under these definitions recover ... 
against any property which had been the couple's community property at any time after 
October 1, 1993; 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. - Lin1its on the Department's claim against the assets 
of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to Sections 56-218 and 56-21 SA, Idaho 
Code. A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the 
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October!, 1993, community property, 
or the deceased participant's share ofthe separate property, and jointly owned property . 
.. .IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20. 
The Department points to the language in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) as the basis 
for its position that property transferred to the spouse after the look back period is 
recoverable. TIlis proposition is based on the Department's interpretation that ~'other 
arrangement" contained in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)('!)(B) includes property transfelTed by 
way of a Marriage Settlement Agreement. That section contains a laundry list of assets 
which may be recovered at the option of the State, "assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
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assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estatc, living trust) or other arrangement." 
All of the specific transfers of property listed in that section occur in an automatic 
fashion upon the death ofthe owner. Under the Departmcnfs interpretation all 
arrangements or transfers of any type occurring after the look-back date would be "other 
arrangementsH • There is no specific mention oflVIarciagc Settlement Agreements in that 
section. 
Marriage Settlement Agreements are recognizcd under Idaho law and require 
specific statutory cOl'npliance 32-916 et. Seq. An MSA allows one spouse to transmute 
community property to the other. Furthermore, the Idaho legislature contemplated that 
transfers could be made by recipients of Medicaid andlor their spouses without 
compensation in order to avoid repayment. A remedy is provided in Idaho Code 56-218 
(2) which addresses these transfers. That section provides that transfers of real or 
personal property, on or after the look .. back datcs defined in 42 U.S.C. ] 396p, by 
recipients of such aid, or their spouses, without adequate consideration are voidable and 
may be set aside by an action in the district court. 
A transfer of community property by a Marriage Settlement Agreement is not an 
automatic transfer like those specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. 1396(b)(4)(B). Another 
remedy for recovery is provided in Idaho Code 56-218(2). The Departments expansive 
interpretation to include all transactions is not reasonable. 
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Conclusion 
The Marriage Settlement Agreement in this case has not been voided. The assets 
in the estate are the separate property of Emerson; there is no evidence to the contrary. 
The Department may only recover against property in which the recipient spouse had an 
interest at the time of her death. Since Vivian predeceased Emerson she has no legal 
interest in the Separate Property of Emerson under Idaho Law. The Department's Claim 
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Tbis matter came on for hearing on February 8, 2011, on appeal from the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate. Appellant was 
represented by Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, I-Iuman Services Division and the 
Respondent, who is the personal representative for the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. 
W1ggins, was represented by Brad Masingill. Respondent filed a Notice of Augmentation and/or 
Supplementation of his Brief on March 21.2011, which included the recent appeUate decision in 
the Ada County case of George D. Perry, CV-IE·2009-5214. The Court having heard and 
considered the arguments of counsel as well as the briefing filed, now issues this Memorandum 
Decision on Appeal. 
I. FACTS 
Vivian Wiggins was horn and died on January 30,2009. Emerson 
Wiggins was born  and died on February 9, 2009. Vivian and Emerson were 
1 
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married and continued to be married at the time they applied for Medicaid benefits and up until 
the time of Vivian's death. In June 2002, Vivian was admitted to a nursing home. Emerson 
and Vivian applied for medical assistance on November 18,2002 to help pay for Vivian's 
medical care and again on August 27, 2003. Vivian became eligible for Medicaid on September 
1,2003, and between that time and Vivian's death, the Department of Health and Welfare 
(Department) paid for Vivian'g medical care through Medicaid, in the sum of at least 
$272,134.68. The Department received a voluntary payment in April 2008, in the amount of 
$7,460.23, resulting in the Department's claim anl0unt of $264.876.45. 
A joint probate estate for Vivian and Emerson (the Estate) was opened on May 21, 2009. 
and the inventory which was filed shows assets of $78,659.44. On November 23, 2009, the 
Department filed a claim against the Estate for medical assistance paid on behalf of Vivian in the 
amount of$264,674.45. The Estate's personal representative filed a Notice ofDisallowanee of 
Claim on November 30~ 2009. The trial court heard the Department's petition for allowance ofa 
claim against the Estate on February 3. 2010. The partie::; stipulated in open court that the 
Department treated Vivian as if she had entered into a Marriage Settlement Agreement (MBA) in 
2002 or 2003, but that a copy of the MSA cannot be found. The admitted purpose of the MSA 
was to transfer any assets in which Vivian had an interest to Emerson~ as his sole and separate 
property, so that she would be considered eligible to receive Medicaid benefits. The trial court 
found that the assets in the Estate were Emerson' s separate property based upon the MSA which 
had transmuted the community property to separate property, and there was no legal obligation 
owed by Emerson's Estate to repay the Department for his wife's care from his separate 
property. The trial court disallowed the Department's claim in its Memorandum Decision filed 
on March 30, 2010. The Department appealed that decision to this Court. 
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ll. ISSUES ON APPEAL: 
While the Department I1sts a number of issues in its opening brief; the basic assertion js 
that the Magistrate Judge erred .in detennining that a valid MBA existed and that the MSA 
transmuted Vivian and Emerson's community property to the separate property of Emerson from 
which the Department could not recover. TIle Department also argues that in maktngthat 
detennination. the trial court improperly interpreted and applied Idaho Code Section 56-218 and 
42 U.s.C. 13961', Both parties assert they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
UI. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
The Department has appealed the trial court's decision to deny the Department's Petition 
for Allowance of Claim seeking recovery from the Estate of money spent on Vivian's healthcare. 
The Department argues that it is entitled to recover this money under 1. C. §S6-218 from assets 
which were the separate property of Emerson at the time of Vivian's death. The Department also 
contends that Vivian's estate includes the property she transferred to Emerson through the MSA 
and is an asset which is subject to a claim for Medicaid reimbursement under both federal and 
state law. Finally, the Department asserts that it did not stipulate to all of the faets the magistrate 
judge relied on in his decision. 
Respondent argues that under both state and federal law, the claim filed by the 
Department only applied to property in which Vivian had an interest as of the date of her death 
and does not apply against Emerson's separate property which he acquired when the MSA 
transmuted the community property to separate property. 
3 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL 
CANYON CO LAW CLERKS PAGE 135 
A. Standard of review 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge as an appellate 
proceeding, rather than exercising the option of granting a trial de novo. the district judge is 
acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596 (1992). 
A court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and 
competent, though conflicting, evidence. LR.C.P. 52(a). The trial court is the arbiter of 
conflicting evidence; its determination of the weight, credibility, inference, and implications 
thereof win not be supplanted by this Court's impressions or conclusions from tlle written record 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck. 146 Idaho 423, 431-432, 196 P.3d 341,349.350 (2008). 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. State v. Hart. 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). Interpretation of a statute 
begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 
978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts 
give effect to the statute as written~ without engaging in statutory construction. Stale v. Rhode, 
133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). Only where the Janguage is ambiguous wW this 
Conrt look to rules of construction for guidance and consider the reasonableness of proposed 
interpretations. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Deptt of Agric .. 143 Idaho 36o, 
368, 146 P.3d 632,634 (2006). Moreover. unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated, 
ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when construing a statute. Bunt v. City of 
Garden City, 118 Idaho 427, 430~ 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990). In construing a statute, this Court 
will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation. but will ascertain and give effect to the 
purpose and intent ofthe legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending 
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substance and meaning to the provisions. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue. 148 Idaho 
391.,398,224 PJd 458~ 465 (2008). 
B. Stipulation of facts 
At the hearing before the trial court, both the Department and the Estate, through their 
respective attorneys, stipulated to the fact that the Department treated Vivian and Emerson as if 
an MSA had been entered into between them prior to Vivian's receipt of Medicaid assistance. 
They further stipulated that the MSA was entered into for the purpose of transmuting Vivian's 
interest in the community property to Emerson' s separate property so she could meet the 
eligibiHty requirements to receive Medicaid!. Both agreed that the original MSA could not be 
located. On appeal the Department is challenging the existence of the MSA and its effect in 
transmuting property, even though it failed to raise the issue with the trial court and appears, 
from the record. to have af:,'Teed to these facts. Based up<.m the parties> stipulation, the Court will 
not address this issue further. 
C. Idaho Code Section 56-218(1) 
The Department argues that I.C. §56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate oIthe 
recipient of Medicaid and also from the estate of the recipient's spouse. Respondent argues that 
the claim filed by the Department only applied to property in which Vivian. had an interest as of 
the date of her death and doe~ not apply against Emerson's separate property. 
Idaho Code Section 56-218 is entitled "Recovery of certain medical assistance" and 
provides in part: 
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal 
law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on hehalf of an 
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the 
! ft appears the intent was to enable Vivian to become eligible for Medicaid assistance while at the same time 
leaving Emerson, who did not need nursing home care. with enough money on which to live while Vivian was in the 
nursing home. 
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individual received such assistance may be recovered from the 
individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid 
paid to either or both .... 
The Department argues that this section give~ broad authority for the Department to seek 
. PAGE 07 
recovery from the spouse of a Medicaid recipient fOT any monies owed. Admittedly this part of 
the statute appears to allow such recovery, but there are additional provisions which narrow this 
authority. 
Idaho Code §56-218(4) states as follows: 
For purposes of this section. the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; 
and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which 
the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to 
the extent of such interest, including such assets conveyed to a 
survivor. heir, or assign, ofthe deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust 
or other arrangement. 
The Department agrees that "individual" as used in this statute refers to the recipient, Le. Vivian. 
Thus~ the question becomes, once the MSA was executed, was there any property in which 
Vivian had "any legal title or interest at the time of death?" It appears from a plain reading of 
this section that the recipient's estate includes not only property in which the recipient had a 
legal interest but also property which passed by operation of law to someone else at the time of 
the recipient's death. Neither of those circumstances would include property which the recipient 
had sold~ given away or transferred prior to death. 
Part of the difficulty is that the Department's interpretation of what should be included in 
the recipient's estate ignores Idaho community property law and does not address the impact of 
having separate property in the recipient's spouse's estate. Indeed. in its brief, the Department 
asserts that I.e. §56-218(1) "effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to the 
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property of Medicaid recipients and their spouses." There is no indication in this statute that the 
Idaho legislature intended such a sweeping change by simply authorizing the State to assert a 
claim against a recipienCs spouse's estate. 
Idaho Code defines sepatate property in Section 32-903 as; 
All property of either the husband or the wife owned by him or her 
before marriage, and that acquired afterward by either by gift, 
bequest, devise or descent, or that which either he or she shall 
acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate propertyt by way 
of moneys or other property, shaH remain his or her sole and 
separate property. 
A debt incurred by the Medicaid recipient is a community debt and clearly the recip.ient'~ interest 
i.ll separate property or in the tecipient's share of community property would be liable. Idaho 
Code §32-91 t states: "The separate property of the wife [husband] is not liable for the debts of 
her husband [his wife), but is liable for her own debts contracted before or after mamage." 
TypicaUy, under Idaho community property law. the spouse's separate property is not Hable for 
debts incurred by the other spouse, I.C. § 32-912, entitled "Control of community property" 
provides: 
Either the hushand or the wife shall have the right to manage and control 
the community property, and eitber may hind the community property by 
contract, except that neither the husband nor wife may sell, conveyor 
encumber the community real estate unless the other joins in executing the 
sale agreement. deed or other instrument of conveyance by which the real 
estate is sold. conveyed or encumbered, and any community obligation 
incurred by either the husband or the wife without the consent in writing 
of the other shall not obligate the separate properly of the spouse who did 
no! so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife may by 
express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell, 
conveyor encumber community property, either real or personal. All 
deeds~ conveyances, bills of sale~ or evidences of debt heretofore made in 
conformity herewith are hereby validated. (emphasis added) 
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* There is nothing in the record to indicate that Emerson signed in ""Tiring agreeing to bind his 
separate property for the debts of Vivian. While that may very wen have been part of the 
Medicaid application process, it is not in the record. Thus, while I.e. §56~2l8 gives the 
Department the legal authority to seek reimbursement from both spouses, it doesn't answer the 
question of which assets in the estate are liable for the Medicaid debt. 
At the hearing in this matter, the Department admitted that it cannot pursue property that 
has always been the separate property of the recipient's spouse (even though this contradicts the' 
Department's argument that I.e. 56-218 broadly allows recovery against both, spouses' estates). 
The Department contends it can coHeet from separate property that was once community 
property if it Wag community property after October 1, 1993, and it justifies this position by 
citing to a Department rule that provides as tollows: 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (deleted in 2010) 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's claim 
against the assets of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to 
Sections 56-218 and 56-21SA, Idaho Code. A claim against the 
estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the 
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993. 
community property. or the deceased patticipant's share of the 
separate property, and jointly owned property. Recovery will not 
be made until the deceased participant no longer is survived by a 
spouse, a child who is under age twenty-one (2 I), or a blind or 
disabled child, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c as amended and, 
when applicable, ag provided in Subsection 900.09 oftrus rule. No 
recovery will be made if the participant received medical 
assistance as the result of a crime committed against the 
participant. (3~30-07) 
IDM A 16.03.09.900.24 (deleted in 2010) 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A 
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which 
separates assets for a mamed couple does not eliminate the debt 
against the estate of the deceased participant or the spouse. 
Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or other such 
agreement may be voided ifnot for adequate consideration. (3-30. 
07) 
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Both of the IDAPA rules that the Department relics on were deleted in 2010. At oral argument 
the Department was unable to justify the reasoning or logic to support its .position that some 
separate property of the recipient's spouse is liable to the State whiJe other separate property is 
not (apart from the Rule mentioned above), 
Thus, while I.e. §56-218 gives the Department the authority to seek recovery from the 
estate of a Medicaid recipient's spouse, it does not answer the question of whether it controls 
over Idaho's community property law and allows recovery from separate property which would 
otherwise not be liable for community debts incurred by the recipient Absent some clear 
authority, this Court does not read this statute to do so. 
D. Meaning of "estate" 
The Department argues that not only can it coHect from separate property in Emerson's 
estate, but it ean also collect from property which once belonged to Vivian. It makes this 
argument based on the definition of "estate" contained in federal and state Jaws. The Department 
argues that I.e. §56-218 authorizes recovery in this case because the statute does not say that 
recovery is limited to assets of the community. Respondent argues that the federal statute only 
provides recovery for property in Vivian's estate; property jn which Vivian had an interest at the 
time of her death; and community property. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has reviewed the federal Medicaid program and its relationship 
with the state. "While it is often thought of as providing medical care only for the .indigen~ it 
also provides coverage for the aged whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the 
costs of necessary medical services including nursing horne care." Stafford v. Idaho Dept. of 
Health & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 534, 181 .P.3d 456, 460 (2008), The States operate Medicaid 
by their own design but these programs must be consistent with federal standar.ds and 
regUlations. Id. Both the federal government and the state government expect federal law to 
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predominate III determining qualifications for receipt of Medicaid assistance. Id. FinaIly~ the 
Court went on to comment that: "Over the years, as the Medicaid program evolved from strictly 
an indigent assistance program to one that provided assistance to elderly persons who stnlggle to 
meet the cost of medical and nursing home care, steps were taken to keep those recipients from 
having to divest themselves of their home and other basic resources." Id. 
The de.fiuitions of "estate" under state law and fcdera11aw are similar. The state 
definition which is found at I.e. §56-218(4) was previously quoted above. The federal1aw 
governing Medicaid defines "estate" in Title 42 U.S.CA. § 1396p as follows: 
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid tu'lder a State plan 
(4) For purpo!\es of this subsecdon~ the term "estate", with respect to a deceased 
individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include1 at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an individual 
to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal property and other 
assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to th.e 
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of 
the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common. survivorship, life 
estate, Hving trust. or other arrangement. 
Thus fcclcrallaw includes all assets in the recipient's estate which would be allowed under state 
probate law, and also allows the state to broaden "estate'~ for purposes of recovering medical 
assistance to include other property in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, as 
Idaho has. Federal law does not discuss the impact of state community property laws and~ 
presumably, that must be up to the state. 
The Department admitted that the state and federal definitions of "estate" apply only to 
the '"individual's" estate (Le. recipient, not spouse of recipient). The Department also agrees that 
Vivian had no legal interest in any property at the time ofhar death; however, it argues that the 
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federal definition ofuassets" found in 42 USC 1396p(11)(l) must be incorporated. The federal 
law governing Medicaid defines '''assets'' in Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p as foHows: 
(h) Definitions 
In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
(1) The term <tassets". with respect to an individual, includes all 
income and resources of the 1ndivldual and of the individual's 
spouse, including any income or resources which the individual or 
such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because 
ofa060n--
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a persont including a court or administrative body, with 
legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or 
such individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, 
acting at the direction or upon the request ofthe individual or such 
individual's spouse. 
That provision, which is difficult to understand at best, broadens what should be included in the 
recipient's estate and appears to include resources which the recipient would have had in his or 
her estate but for the actions ofthe recipient or the recipient's spouse. While tb.is would appear 
to include property transmuted by virtue of an MSA as the Department argues. there is nothing in 
the statute that makes this happen automatically. Tn other words~ simply because the definition 
of "assets" could include that property doesn't mean that such transactions are set aside without 
further action. There should be some action taken to recover those resources into the recipient's 
estate, such as setting aside the MSA, which will be discussed later in this Decjsion. 
E. Effect of Idalt() Dept of Healtlz and Welfare v. Jackman 
In its brief, the Department argues that the issue presented by this appeal has already been 
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Dept. qfHealth and Welfare v. Jac/cman, 132 
Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). That case does have facts similar to those in this case but it 
addressed the version afLe. §56-218 in effect in 1993. In Jackman. a marriage settlement 
agreement was signed, which transmuted most ofthe wife's community property into the 
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separate property of the husband. After the wife died> her estate was probated and the money left 
in her estate was paid to the State as partial reimbursement for the Medicaid paid on behalf of the 
\vife. After the husband died, the State sought to obtain additional monies owed for the wife's 
Cafe from the husband's estate. The Court held that the federal statute regarding recovery of 
IYiedicaid assistance as it existed in 1993> did not permit the Department to recover from the 
husband's estate. This was so because the definition of "assets" from which recovery could be 
made excluded "assets disposed of on or before [Aug. 10, 1993]." Because the MSA executed 
by Jackman was signed prior to this date~ any assets transferred by that document were excluded. 
While the Supreme Court did tal.k about the effect of the 1993 amendments in broadening the 
definition ofuassets," that was not necessary to the Court's decision based on its reasoning. The 
Court was not presented direcdy with the question of whether? un.der tbe law as it now exists, 
federal law would trump state community property laws in making separate property liable for 
debts that could otherwise not be recovered from separate property. 
While it would seem that the Department has no recourse against assets transferred to the 
recipient's spouse, there is an additional provision which allows it to set aside the MSA and 
place tbe assets back in the recipient's estate. Thus, regardless of how the tenns <'estate" and 
"assets" are interpreted, there is a process through which the Department can set aside the MSA 
and can collect current or former community property from both spouses' estates as ifthe MSA 
never existed. 
F. Application of I.e. §56-218 (2) 
Idaho Code Section 56-218(2) states: 
Transfers of real or personal property, on or after the look-back 
dates defined in 42 U.S.C. 1396p~ by recipient.:; of such aid, or their 
spouses, without adequate consideration are voidable and may be 
set aside by an action in the distri.ct court. 
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This statute has also been incorporated into a Department rule: 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (deleted in 2010) 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A 
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which 
separates assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt 
against the estate of the deceased participant or the spouse. 
Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or other such 
agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-30-
07) 
PAGE 86 
If the terms "estate" and "asset'~ are as broad as has been argued by the Department, those terms 
would automatically include any property transferred by an MSA and there would be no need to 
set aside such an agreement. Not every transfer of property by a Medicaid recipient is improper 
or without adequate consideration, nor should transferred property automatically be included in 
the individual's estate and be liable for reimbursement of Medicaid benefits paid. Some action 
should be required in order for those resources to be included and I.e. §56-218(2) is the vehicle 
for doing so. 
TIle Department argues this proYision is of no use to them in cases like tbe cucrellt one 
because there is a three-year statute of limitations for setting aside the MSA and that ran in 2005, 
well before Emerson died. This is a matter which could be addressed by the Idaho legislature in 
order to give the Department more time within which to set aside the MSA. It is not a 
justification for broadly interpreting the meaning of "estate" or amending Idaho community 
property law so the Department doesn't have to go through the process of setting aside an MSA. 
The Department further argues that it can't go back and void the MSA after the fact 
because that would render Vivian "ineligible" for benefits, meaning that she should never have 
received benefits in the first place. That argument ignores the fact that I.C. §56-218 (2) 
specifically provides that any transfer of property without adequate consideration is Hvo1dabl~" 
not "yoid". A voidable contract is one in which the parties have the power to avoid the contract 
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provisiol1S) or they can ratifY it and it will continue in effect Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 180,45 P.3d 829, 836 (2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §7. 
A void contract is one that is treated as jf it never existed, void ab initio. TIle consequences of 
voiding a voidable contract vary depending on the circumstances; thus, setting aside tbe MSA 
would no! necessarily retroactively affect benefits already paid to the recipient. 
Moreover, 42 USC I 396p(e)(2)(B)(i), which governs asset transfers for the purposes of 
Medicaid reimbursement provides in part as follows: 
(2) An individual shaH not be ineligible for medical assistance by 
reason of paragraph (1) to the extent that--
*** 
(B) the assets·· 
(0 were transferred to the individual's spouse or to another for the 
sole benefit of the individual's spouse, 
This means a recipient is not ineligible for benefits by reason of having disposed of assets for 
less than their fair market value to the extent that the assets were transfetred to a spouse for the 
spouse's benefit. That is exactly what LC. §56~218 (2) is designed for - it allows the State to set 
aside transfers that Jack consideration) and the transfer doesn't render the recipient ineligible for 
benefits. 
G. Attorney fees 
Both parties have asserted a fight to attomey fees pUfsuant to Idaho Code §12-117 which 
provides as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any 
administrative proceedings Of civil judicial proceeding 
involving as adverse parties a state agency or pontical 
subdivision and a person~ the state agency or political 
subdivision or the court, as the case may be, shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees. witness fees 
and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law. 
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It is this Court's view that the questions presented by this app~a1 are difficult and complex,; 
involving i11terpretation of state and federal Medicaid benefits Jaw. While this Court has 
concluded that the maglstra.tejudge was correct in denying the Department's claim. the answer is 
by no means simple or dear and both parties presented persuasive arguments regarding their 
views of how the statutes and administrative rules should be interpreted. This is clearly not a 
situation where either party acted "·without a reasonable basis in fact or law" and therefore, both 
requests for attorneys fees on appeal are denied. The Respondent is entitled to its costs on 
appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The burden is on the Department to assert a cognizable claim against Vivian and 
Emerson's Esta.te and to support it by citation to some statute. The statutes must be clear that not 
only can the Department coUect from. the recipient, Vivian, but ~hat there's a statutory basis for 
claiming property of Emerson which would otherwise not be Hable for Vivian's debts under 
Idaho's community property law. While Vivian's estate could have included property she 
transmuted to Emerson utilizing I.e. §56·218 (2), that was not done in this casco Broadening the 
meaning of "estate" under Idaho law in order to reach Emerson's separate property, or altering 
accepted community property law, is not an alternative solution to allow recovery to the 
Department. Based on the reasoning above~ the decision of the trial 
~ 
DATED this b:::d. day of July, 2011. 
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ON PJift'l1:'ION FORA W1U'f'Ol'ClfRTIORAIU 
10 11111 SUPMliIJlCOURTOl' MlNNilSOTA 
the COUrt'1 
iIIrffNt'_1U1I the ri.". of th. 
'fJ4 




'U1II't~mrnu::d"lL altboap the M8dt .. 
_lllel~IY l"«irbldA a ilppUeu' or her 
t:rIIlD8r_I113~  ill below ~ ?alu4I. 
tor beDeftt.. U.S.O. 
llNp<c)(l)(A). the -PI-17 permit.a tile appU-
CUlt to ~~ lDehadlDa lID iD~' hi the hom. 
~. to the ccmuI.nmJt;, ~-, u.s.o. 
Once th. lwIdtadcmaJiMd d 
.ll8'1bl. beadta, uae providu UUI& "'no re-
iI>Ourelllll or the eommaw9'.pouM .luIU .van .. 
able to Use kwtttatioWlliHd U~8.0. I ~Ilillll"-
lKc)(4). 
c. A.iI .. PlMI'lral 
an wu penna-
M~I"';Y jDt.mt;uu10Da~d. U.S.C. 1396P(b)(1)(A}, and 
.... _-"".- ai qe 56 or thereat .. 
hom. and eommuwq· 
~.~ h(Mlpftal and ptUCriptioD 
In addJUoft, a State 
~..-.vl"'_ of COlt or ou. .. it9mJJ 
on betudf of m~1dual. ovM" the ap ot 
1f:rUL reeovel7 "m~ ~ made onI7 after the 
d.ath of the individual'. I\u"'rlml' sPOUIe, it fm'I," and 
only a when the indlvtdual hu no nntrin, ebU· 
dren under 81'0 of .21 or ehlldnD who are blind or 
dtubJed. U,S.C.1396p(b){.2) and (2)(A). Suell reeoY-
mq be in cues it "would work an uu-
U.S.C. 13HP(b)(3). 
ltal~te n1Nll'rid.NR tor rerovel'1 of the COgjt 
an individual over ... of 
U.S.C. 1396P(b)(1)(B). 
DUl:1:101iiea, M!ShaD mclude aU 
other JiU\lIIimLili .. '1 .... 'HU.J'I.I! 
5 
J*itfOD" tn. a claim ~ the i/!8tata 
Fnmd.II SlII'I', III whicll he 1OU1h' ~.)' of Medfeaid 
paid Oil bellslt of Mr. BUlfI pred~ 
!JOO'ID& Doloree SArI- Pet. App. 4&.1 
L Darin, their nutn''''' the SllI'p pureha.led real 
I"'IPftn_r:'lII In PrincetoD, MUmuota, to which the,. took 
ten,lIOt&. Ie .2001. Mil. Baq M~ a DW"8-
ahol't11' thereafter appUed (or, nt-
Il'Ift ..... f'A'Irm Med1eajd beutllt.l.. PeL 
luI::IH<NiHiltb' tr1uYt'en:ed joint teDlmey 
hOlnetabUad 101Mnj~rt'lli to Mr. 
l4IiellUta. viJue 
\ OnMweh 
{ti~NU ~ wJn~Ma 
Il!I.~ in tb:iI briIIII ~ ~~,.... 
" , 
IOUllft& to rweove.r 
011 bebaItoi 
II re~tatfy. 
~J~", u " claim lIlUllWlIIlit 
"'II-.&N'G.Uo.. llritL' 
Pe~~tflf)Qe~ roed a flaim-allowance pltitioa atat. 
~ upheld pvt1al dfHUowuaL 
App. The coon. reUad on the Mbmaota 
Court of AppeaJa' dedtt<m fa Ifl .,.. g~ 01 GvllIHnv, 
N.W.2d 101 (2OOJ), whJeh held thM Mbmaotat • 
M~neover:r law II preempted lnaofuo M it pwmibl 
t'fiCI1"I'_7 up ~ ill. nil •• ot the aueta of the *ltate ~ 
.... marital pNperty' at..., pomt m ilIe ~ be-
eawee 41 U.8.0. 1391p(b)(J)(B) permJta ~ff!t'1 o~ "'to 
a:teut of" th. Medladd reclplaatJ>, latenMlt the 
0( desUa. G~t &U N.W.u .114. eottrt 
fOtileluded that, Uma clh. deaUt. MI. B&t'I"'a mteralt 
_IIIIW of Hr. Bar(a eIIt.Ke that Wlmt prop-
mcJUdmc Ii ~taie the ftOlDmItaMJ 
91 '1 . , 
21d 
7 
an initial matter, the coorlrejeeted reapondent'. 
contention that federalla. completely preempt. Mhme-
eltate-~fi"T law IMOlu- u it plH'mlt. reeove17 
tram the estate at tbe Medicaid recipient'. surririnl' 
.pouse. Pet. App. 19.-30.. The court eoneluded that 
l11owinlrecaveQ" from a snrririq 8pOQ8e'S elt&te ia eon-
,u .. ?_ ... ? with both the preeh,udon of reeover,y from 
Medlcatd recipient'. e8tate nnW after the death of a 
U.S.C. 1396p(b}(2)(A), u weD M the 
MemCalO Act', reeDVer:v pf'O'Vi8:iou. Pet. 
HlI"UitA\ll" .~_.- I"8C09'iM" th., IImloua&. 
D~. 

Althoup the general .tam .. 
delbrition encomp_ reaoan:. of 
"the indhldual- (t. .. , the Medfeafd redpiOllt) aud. 
.. the indiridual', spc:n:uwt " the partfeulal' prondou of the 
Act at !allue hen reten speritlealb' to td.7 ..... 
m which th41 i1ldi1Jid1l4l had U111elal title or inter-
the tim. of death." U.S.C. 1896P(b)(4)(B) (em.-
phu" added). Petltionerl U'11Ullftt ftnda it. n~ 
to nnvrite that elan.e to 14'1:07 • liJ • u.eta In 
whLch tIuI iM{~ aM ~ indivichu:d'. 
title or intef'elt/" 2' (brllcll: ... 
in oriainal) (emph .. w added). But t.hla 
,,"''''AUK leu make the 8ta~Dte 
plain lup •• of the 
petitioner'1 r •• (unjr. 
But Act 
u couplet, bome. tram eorurideratioDt 
1382b(aXt), 13Mr..&(c)(5), md .UOft the eomma-
3DOuae to retaiD cert.am amount. of retOU~ 
are not considered avdable to pal 
8DlJillcl.nt'i me<llle.aA eat"et U.S.O. 1398r-6(d) eel (1)(2). 
ODce the WtitutioD&ti.AId 'poOI. f&\ (1!1ftJIIII!"-
eUJibte for benefJtt, the Medicaid Aet pro-
videa $4no reaoureee of the community 'POUIe ,hall 
deemed avallable to theln.UbJUonaUsed IpoUH. '" 4a 
U.S.C. 18Hr-6(cX4). The Medicaid ~ m Ihon, Im-
ai,Wfieant lilnitatJOM OD peUtioneD uaerled 
n'ilO'l",,""'ftu. that "apouHa are ~ to IUpport eaeh 
2/1. To nad &ction 1896P<bX4XB) in aceor-
ita plaiD tennI thul fa conafitent with 
OI'fl~!lIu:n~r atatatar'1aenem.e. 
ecaUH Section 13Hp(b) le"vet DO amb'pity 
"".u' ...... fi apoWlal eata~ t'eCfJVt!fI:"T to the value of 
the Medleafd reeJpSent had a le,1ll 
of death, the pN~IUJnpt1oD .'IMW" 
not come into pI." Pet. 
U.S . • '0, 
I!f'f"II 
tbe Mlnneaota. ~ttl!'rMllm. ,PAU,_'m 
~_iI'i ... 1I'!I 13HP(b}(4)(B) 'a m~)UI.telrlt 
tation resporudble fNimlW'lld M1U'!e:f. 
promulgated nplatiou nor pj,dIULl~ fftl'_ 
pntinl' Section 13Hp(b}(4}(B) to III.UU10rtl. 
el$tate reeovel7 that petJtio06' 
lure, eMS hi 2007 approved MUllnetlOta It.IU! pJIUl 
amendment ineorporatma italtatutoq $poaw ~tr7 
proviaiolll. See Pet. App. 8h-98&. Bat eMS', approval 
not equivalent of bfndjq interpm~ auidance. 
Ct .. 4! C.F.R. 480.16(a)(1) (a ,tate pbm or plaa amend ... 
ment .. deemed approved it eMS d~ not ~ within 
afteI' ~i\d.n::lul.ioD). MOHO'Yer. eMS'. approval 101-
bindiftl Judidal dedldOM awn 
,,-~-.. lntm'pn!tJna the recovW7 to 
.......... UB In whicb the MediaUd aD "nt-A __ 1Ilt. 
"'11., I", 11'1 
{Mbm. ct. 
C&M aud m WtrtJ mq 
the me~ of fedenl 
North Dakota Supnm. 
Supreme Court, atated tha, 
""[eould] UMrt a elaim real Of' pereoaaJ 
4 As! tn. MI:Il~ Su~ Coorl n~ (PK. Aw- 11 • ." two 
nth«,~ eI'M"'bI haw that ~ l~) ... ~"'" 
from t.M ~ or II M~d Nd~ ud net.lrom tM 
.. ~ a-Himev.~CIf~ofPWI.Ai4,SIO 
14S(Dl~1'1t."8~of~I54lN.W.fd2.(Wt&CL 
1_). But. tboM ~ I.l'Iod t.M ~ ~ U'It net. hl ~ 
Both H'inM IIIlid an ~ wttl! U. ~ tMc a 
__ ota~Wm","~ 
~~ 1~)(4)(B) to~ 








• lll"lmnrl"" -_._"'" ~ tMnN. at 
U:.m.t ot~). a. 
aid 
~ICDm. 11 Dot. ,jIOftltf_lhll' 
appe~ to that 
despite forma! cou.veyuce 
llalIII.-rJII D.II"JOl'ft dntb, retabsed D m~ in 
nrrl1'W1'rtY untU hill death, wben the m~ wu COD-
"'''''1,_ to IpoUH thnnap Moth. U'1"U1"ID_t.1iO &07 
_ 88& (quotlna d U.S.C. 18Mp(bX")(B». Th. 
court did not elaborate OD the nature of thllt bl~ 
although it referred to the State', arpm_t thllt 
recipient had retlined .. "marital or equitable bltt\rl-
bs tho auto at the time of hit death. id.. at 888, and 
that other CO\lN bad interpreted Section 
lS96p(bX.f.)(B) to raeb atat.law eommumt7-propel'tJ 
homntud interelta, UL at 881. 
different reaultl reached by the North Dakota 
H111Fll"\lllmll!! Court and the court below on facta thUti 
not eonfUctma' interpntaUou of federal 
MttUiC:&10 law, but oab' dUf'-'Di views of 'Wb~ nln,"UI!!l1I" 
law, a lllpouae nriaiu 1& 
rfl!l'lv<!ll'1I'1IId to hie or hft' I~ 
~~a. with Pet. App. <Jl.M~,a ffli'H'llfOlI'rll'lnl'l 
td 
~_do that. tIw North Li'_~ &lBln1t1l:Ma 
undentood fedend Medlcafd 
applied II peeulblr f'_~:n_ 
North Dakota eourt not 1ft Oi3filOrW:Oiit;v 
.. dcr BUSt. IntllJrp~ get the eo~I.fU~~ 
out .. tile Wtul II tartJlcr iddNUed 
eom1:a. 
Altboulh peUtioner (Pet. 81-81) ie eon_ ~ 
.tate-l'ft'OVtr)' .ttorta are importaDt to the M~d 
p~ quuUou eou~. the seope th ..A.U'. 
ealtat.~V7 provf.liOAI bani Dot &ri.Nft frequentl7. 
aDd relatiYe9' few StItu bay. opted to ~ n!eOT .. 
tJq the maximum ~t pemattted b7 feden! law. 
S. OfIJee of AHfstat  tor hUq 6 E'f'lWIII-
tiom. RD. Poliq No. Mih'liCdi4 &tcoWWfl 
Co~ thl. "(s.pt. 2006) (onb' nbM make 
ru:ldmitam use of federal poUq opt{ou); .. alto Ptt.. 81. 
Moreover, altbovp the fedenl.MecUeallCl 
those <UMI.W 
CONCLUSION 
C..uot. J. :aBHHlnT 
h~G~ • 
u&>1IIL4lr1 M. STAFFORD 
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